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CHALLENGING THE FOUR "TRUTHS"
OF PERSONAL SOCIAL SECURITY
ACCOUNTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE
WORLD OF 401(K) PLANS
COLLEEN E. MEDILL*
This Article discusses the final recommendations of the President's
Commission to Strengthen Social Security concerning the
proposed creation of a system of personal Social Security
accounts. The Article critically evaluates the Commission's
findings (the four "Truths") in light of numerous research studies
concerning participant-directed 401(k) plans. The Article claims
that Truth #1, the assertion that all workers will be better off in
terms of total benefits from the combination of traditional Social
Security and personal account benefits, is based on unrealistic
assumptions concerning how workers choose to diversify their
investments. The 401(k) plan research evidence suggests that, due
to their choice of investments, many workers are unlikely to earn
the Commission's assumed rate of investment return on personal
Social Security accounts. Truth #2, the assertion that a
government-sponsored program of investment education will
change worker investment behavior and lead to improved
investment performance, is contradicted by recent research
showing that an investment education program for 401(k) plan
participants generally is ineffective in changing investment
behavior. The Article claims that Truth #3, the assertion that
personal accounts will provide the opportunity for low-income
and minority workers to "build wealth," is misleading for two
reasons. First, low-income workers who survive to retirement will
be forced to annuitize all of their personal account assets to satisfy
the Commission's minimum retirement income standard. Second,
the Commission's proposed structure gives rise to adverse
selection, the costs of which will fall most heavily on low-income
workers. Finally, the Article addresses Truth #4, that personal
accounts will be structured so that large sums of money (and its
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related power) will not be concentrated in the hands of a few
government bureaucrats and money managers. The Article argues
that to attain the high rates of worker participation necessary to
achieve sustained popular and political support for a personal
account system, the system must adopt an enrollment approach
patterned after automatic enrollment 401(k) plans. Recent
research studies of automatic enrollment 401(k) plans show that
automatically enrolled participants have a strong tendency to
remain "stuck" in the plan's default investment fund. The Article
claims that workers in a personal account system will do the same,
thereby resulting in: (1) political pressure for an investment
strategy for the default fund that furthers social policy goals, rather
than maximizing investment returns; and (2) a potentially
troublesome concentration of assets in the system's default
investment fund.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2001, the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security released its final report on proposed
reforms to the Social Security system ("Commission Report").' The
Commission Report proposes three models for reforming the
traditional Social Security program through the creation of personal
1. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., STRENGTHENING
SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS (Dec. 21,
2001) (Sup. Doc. No. PR43.8:SO1/ST8/FINAL), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/
GPO/LPS16829 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT]. The future financial woes facing America's Social Security program have been
well documented. See id. at 64; BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS INS.
AND DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY
INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 107-55, at 8-14 (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/7:
107-55). According to "best estimates" by the board of trustees for the Social Security
program, benefit expenditures are expected to exceed payroll tax revenues starting in
2016. See H.R. DOC. NO. 107-55, at 14. Full program benefits would continue to be paid
by drawing down assets held in the Social Security trust funds until 2038. See id. At that
point, the trust funds would be depleted, and tax revenues would provide only seventy-
three percent of program benefits. See id.
Of these two dates (2016 and 2038), it is the 2016 date that is significant for
purposes of the federal budget. Writing separately, the two independent trustees of the
Social Security and Medicare programs described the significance as follows:
[Rlather than providing net revenue to the Treasury, after 2016 the combined
trust funds will require rapidly growing infusions of revenues from the Treasury
to pay benefits projected under current law. It is at this point-and not at the
later dates when trust fund assets (i.e., the securities being redeemed) are
technically exhausted-that Social Security and Medicare will begin to be in
direct competition with other Federal programs for the resources of the
Treasury, requiring either growing tax increases or debt financing (or some
combination of the two) to pay the benefits promised under current law and
provide for the continuation of other Federal expenditures.
SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE PROGRAMS, A SUMMARY OF THE 2001 ANNUAL REPORTS 13-14; see also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 68 (describing positive annual system cash flow as a
"useful metric"). For a straightforward explanation of the nature of the Social Security
trust fund, see MICHAEL TANNER, NO SECOND BEST, THE UNAPPETIZING
ALTERNATIVES TO SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION 6 (CATO Project on Social
Security Privatization, No. 24, 2002), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ssps/ssp24.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Social Security accounts.2 Under each model, workers would deposit
a portion of their Social Security payroll tax contributions in personal
accounts and have the ability to direct the investment of assets held in
their personal accounts.3 A portion of the workers' traditional Social
Security benefit, paid in the future at retirement, would be reduced.
This "offset amount" is calculated based on an assumed rate of
investment earnings for the account.4 The Commission Report
describes this offset method common to each of the three reform
models as follows:
[E]very dollar invested in a personal account reduces the
cost of future Social Security payments by one dollar, plus
the offset rate of interest that is proposed for each plan
(ranging from 2 percent to 3.5 percent after inflation). Total
expected benefits to the worker are increased by the
compounded difference between the offset rate of interest
for the Reform Model and the expected rate of return
earned by the personal account. So long as the personal
account earns a return higher than the offset rate, both
Social Security and the individual come out ahead.5
The Commission Report also suggests a complex administrative
structure for regulating personal Social Security accounts.6 This
proposed administrative structure, which the Commission
recommends for all three proposed reform models, essentially is
paternalistic in nature. It is designed primarily to ensure that the
balance in the worker's personal account will be sufficient to replace
the dollar reduction in the worker's traditional Social Security
benefits paid at retirement.7
The literature to date on proposals to "privatize" Social Security
through the creation of personal accounts has emphasized either the
normative implications of structural change8 or the impact of reform
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. See discussion infra Part I.
4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 74.
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See generally Dorothy A. Brown et al., Social Security Reform: Risks, Returns,
and Race, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633 (2000) (arguing that racial equity should be
given serious consideration when debating Social Security reform); Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact of Social Security Reform on Women's Economic
Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375 (1999) (discussing the impact an incremental
reform of Social Security would have on women in their roles as workers, wives and
widows); Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 983 (2000) (arguing that Social Security
privatization is a political and ideological debate about "public versus private rights and
904 [Vol. 81
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on the long-term finances of the Social Security program.9 This
Article focuses on the four "truths""0 of personal Social Security
income rights versus wealth accumulation"); Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social
Security Work for Women and Men, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 359 (1999) (proposing
that Social Security reform must focus on improving the distribution of benefits among
women and men equally); Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway?
Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653
(1998) (proposing that under a privatized Social Security system, spousal protections
should be required benefits); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Evaluating the Case for Social
Security Reform: Elderly Poverty, Paternalism and Private Pensions, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
749 (1998) (evaluating different proposals for privatization as they relate to reducing
poverty in the elderly, distributing income for low-income workers, and avoiding elderly
dependency and destitution); Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security:
Assessing Its Effects On Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 MO. L. REV.
341 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Partial Privatization] (explaining why partial privatization
of Social Security would have an adverse effect on women, minorities and low-income
workers because of their increased potential poverty in old age); Kathryn L. Moore,
Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131 (1998) (arguing
against privatization because of the investment risks, problems in conversion from the old
system to the new, the paternalistic nature of the proposed system, and its misconception
of the role of national social security) [hereinafter Moore, Misguided Reform]; Sen. Don
Nickles, Retiring In America: Why the United States Needs a New Kind of Social Security
for the New Millennium, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 77 (1999) (supporting total reform of
Social Security in order to implement a new system through the use of private markets);
Lorraine A. Schmall, Transnational Issues of Women and Pension Security and Reform, 14
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 87 (2001) (discussing the effects of pension reform efforts in several
nations on elderly women); Alvin Williams, Reforming Our Ailing Social Security System:
The State of the Current System and Its Impact on African Americans, 8 ELDER L.J. 221
(2000) (proposing that Social Security reform would correct the current system's adverse
effects on African-Americans in particular and Americans in general).
9. Prior to the release of the final Commission Report, critics objected that
proponents of privatization had not clearly explained to the general public how reforms
would improve the long-term financial status of the Social Security program. See Jonathan
Chait, Bold Over, NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 2000, at 22; Jonathan Cohn, Dr. Feelgood,
NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 2000, at 25-27; Henry Aaron et al., Social Security Reform: The
Questions Raised by the Plans Endorsed by President Bush's Social Security Commission
(Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.cbpp.org/11-30-Olsocsec.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The Commission Report addresses this criticism by acknowledging that
certain "investments" (i.e., transition costs) would accompany a move to a personal
account system. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 72. These transition costs are
additional costs to workers during the decades when the plan was being phased
in. These costs would be incurred because workers would have to pay for two
retirement systems at the same time, both the system that is making payments to
current beneficiaries, and the new individual account system that would pay for
some or all of their own retirement.
SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., SOCIAL SECURITY: WHY ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON
19 (rev. ed. July 2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y3/2:AD9/S0 1/2001). Although the Commission
Report does address these financing issues in more detail', none of the three proposed
reform models is projected to return the Social Security system to positive annual cash
flow surpluses before the year 2059. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 113-14
(Model 1), 124-25 (Model 2), and 135-37 (Model 3). Positive cash flow surpluses are an
important political criterion because it is at this fiscal point that the Social Security
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accounts. These "truths" consist of the following findings made by
the Commission in support of personal Social Security accounts:
1. Workers will be better off, in terms of total benefits, with
personal Social Security accounts.1
2. Investment education will change investment behavior
and improve investment performance. As a macroeconomic
bonus, it will encourage more savings and investment among
the public generally.12
3. Personal accounts will allow low income and minority
workers to "build wealth."' 3
4. Giving workers investment control will avoid large
concentrations of money (and its related power) in the
hands of a few government bureaucrats and money
managers.
14
Before relying on these assertions as the basis for fundamental
change in the traditional Social Security program, it seems only
prudent that lawmakers should consider the substantial body of
contradictory evidence from another analogous system-the system
of employer-sponsored 401(k) retirement plans. 5
This Article examines in detail the emerging body of research
concerning 401(k) plans. 6 The Article claims that this research
program finances, rather than competes with, other federal programs for budgetary
resources. See discussion supra note 1.
10. I have chosen to refer to the subject of this Article, the Commission's "findings" in
support of personal Social Security accounts as "truths" because in writing its report the
Commission appears to have accepted what amount to mere assertions as indisputable and
uncontroverted statements of fact.
11. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-35.
12. See id. at 49.
13. See id. at 32-33.
14. See id. at 38-39.
15. Indeed, the Commission Report itself recommends that at least a one-year period
of public debate occur before any type of reform is enacted by Congress. See id. at 65.
16. The 401(k) plan was made possible by the Revenue Act of 1978. See Colleen E.
Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming
ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 7 & nn.25-26 (2000) [hereinafter Medill,
Individual Responsibility Model]. During the 1990s, the 401(k) plan emerged as a highly
popular form of employer-sponsored retirement plans, in large part because participants
are able to direct the investment of their 401(k) plan accounts. See id. at 7-11 & n.24. The
national experience with 401(k) plans today is widespread and significant. See Medill,
Individual Responsibility Model, supra, at 7-9; Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility
and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 475-79 (2001) [hereinafter Medill, Stock
Market Volatility]. Experts estimate that 401(k) plans held approximately $1,766 billion in
assets as of the end of 2000. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO.
239, 401(K) PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN
2000 6 & n.12 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY]. Over 42 million
[Vol. 81
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contradicts each of the four "truths" commonly cited by proponents
of personal Social Security accounts, suggesting that these "truths"
may, in fact, be mere political myths.
The Article begins with a detailed description of the
Commission's three proposed models for personal Social Security
accounts and the general administrative structure common to all
three models. Part II of the Article compares the Commission's
proposed administrative structure for personal accounts with the
structure of 401(k) plans and notes those areas where the
Commission's proposed structure differs from the norm in 401(k)
plans. These structural changes from the 401(k) plan norm are
designed to address the perceived weaknesses of 401(k) plans in
providing for retirement income security. As the discussion in Part II
makes clear, however, the characteristics of personal Social Security
accounts are fundamentally unchanged from the norm in 401(k)
plans.'" Participation in the personal account system is voluntary.
Workers may direct the investment of the assets held in their personal
accounts. At retirement, the balance in the worker's personal
account will determine the level of retirement benefits. These
fundamental similarities, and research evidence from the 401(k) plan
experience, are explored in Part III, the main body of the Article.
Part III is arranged according to the four "truths" propounded by
the Commission in support of personal Social Security accounts. The
first section of Part III examines the Commission's assumptions
concerning investment allocation decisions by workers in their
personal accounts. These assumptions underlie Truth #1, the
assertion that workers will be better off in terms of total benefits from
the combination of traditional Social Security and personal benefits.
This first section of Part III contrasts the Commission's assumptions
with the evidence from studies of investment behavior by participants
in 401(k) plans. These studies strongly indicate that the
Commission's assumptions concerning how workers will allocate the
investment of their personal accounts, and consequently how well
these investments will perform, are unrealistic. The problem of poor
workers today participate in 401(k) plans. See id. at 6. Importantly, for a growing number
of workers, a 401(k) plan is their only employer-sponsored retirement plan. See PENSION
& WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN, ABSTRACT OF 1998 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS, tbls.D4-D5 (2002)
[hereinafter PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN]. For these workers in particular, a
privatized Social Security program could mean that they will be exposing a greater portion
of their retirement nest egg to the potential volatility of the stock market.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
2003]
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investment allocation decisions leading to poor earnings performance
is magnified by the potential for mutual fund fees to further reduce
the worker's account balance at retirement. The first section of Part
III concludes by examining several recent studies of mutual fund fees
by the Department of Labor, the General Accounting Office, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. These studies call into
question the Commission's proposed approach to regulation of the
mutual fund fees that will be deducted from workers' personal
accounts. The Commission's approach appears to rely naively on the
current system of fee disclosure under federal securities law, despite
the growing body of evidence that such disclosure has failed
adequately to inform unsophisticated investors of the adverse impact
of fees on long term investment returns.
The second section of Part III examines recent studies of the
impact of investment education on the investment behavior of 401(k)
plan participants. These studies predict that a program of investment
education aimed at workers who invest in personal accounts will have
little influence on their investment behavior. As an alternative to
investment education, workers who invest in personal accounts could
receive investment advice instead. The recent trend in the 401(k)
plan setting is to deliver personalized investment advice to large
numbers of 401(k) participants through computerized investment
advice programs. This second section of Part III concludes by noting
that the Commission's proposed structure for personal accounts
appears to ignore this recent trend and prohibits the use of such
computerized models. This oversight is unfortunate, because the
computerized investment advice program is an efficient vehicle for
delivering personalized investment advice to the 401(k) plan masses.
It is well-suited to do the same for workers who invest in personal
Social Security accounts.
The third section of Part III examines the assertion that personal
Social Security accounts will allow low-income and minority workers
to "build wealth." This section argues that the wealth-building
argument in support of personal accounts is overstated for two
reasons. First, the Commission's proposed rules for the form of
distributions from personal accounts will require low-income workers
who survive to retirement to annuitize most, if not all, of the balance
in their personal accounts. Second, the Commission's proposed
distribution rules create an adverse selection problem, thereby raising
the costs for workers who choose the traditional annuity distribution
option. This section argues that the increased costs of adverse
selection will fall most heavily on low-income workers, because this is
[Vol. 81
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the group who, due to a lack of other financial resources, can least
afford to bear the risks of longevity themselves by electing to "self-
annuitize" their personal account benefits. In short, it is only by
dying prior to retirement that the estates of low-income workers are
likely to realize any "wealth building" effect from personal accounts.
Many of those who survive to retirement may very well be worse off.
Finally, the fourth section of Part III examines the assertion that
worker-controlled personal accounts will avoid the potential mischief
associated with concentrating large sums of money, and its related
power, in the hands of a few government bureaucrats and money
managers. This section begins with a discussion of the Commission's
attempt to insulate its proposed regulatory structure for personal
accounts from political influence. Two areas of political risk are
identified. First, there is the risk that the political influence of elected
government officials may taint the decision of government regulators
and result in pressure for government-selected investment managers
to engage in social investing. Second, there is the risk that political
pressure from constituents may persuade Congress to override the
protective features of the Commission's recommendations and allow
workers greater access to and control over their personal account
funds, both prior to and during retirement. Next, the Article
examines the Commission's underlying premise that personal Social
Security accounts will be "voluntary." There are two distinct types of
"voluntary" 401(k) plans today: the traditional 401(k) plan, where
the participant must affirmatively elect to enroll in the plan; and the
"automatic enrollment" 401(k) plan, where each eligible employee is
automatically enrolled in the 401(k) plan, but may affirmatively elect
not to participate. Significantly, the Commission does not describe
which type of "voluntary" enrollment system will be utilized for
personal Social Security accounts. The last section of Part III argues
that to obtain the high levels of participation necessary to sustain
popular and political support for a personal account system over the
long term, personal accounts must use an automatic enrollment
system. Recent studies of participant behavior in automatic
enrollment 401(k) plans predict that, contrary to Truth #4, under an
automatic enrollment structure many workers will remain invested in
the "default" investment option for personal Social Security accounts.
Under the Commission's proposed administrative structure, a few
money managers for this default investment option will be selected by
a few governmental officials charged with overseeing the
administration of a personal account system. Although the
Commission stresses the need to insulate these governmental officials
2003]
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from political influence, the selected money managers for the default
investment option are likely to wield control over vast sums and are
likely to face significant political pressure to invest these sums to
achieve political and social objectives, rather than to maximize
earnings performance. The likely result is a rate of investment return
that underperforms the market, and thereby fails to meet worker
expectations.
I. THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The Commission Report offers three models for reform of Social
Security through the use of personal accounts. 8 The Commission
Report also suggests a single administrative structure common to all
three reform models.' 9
Under Model 1, workers may elect to have 2% of their payroll
taxes paid to their personal accounts.2 ° Model 2 assumes that workers
may elect to contribute 4% of their payroll taxes to personal
accounts, up to a maximum contribution of $1,000 annually.2' Neither
Model 1 nor Model 2 would involve an increase in the level of Social
Security payroll taxes paid by the worker, but would merely
reallocate the placement of those dollars from the U.S. Treasury to
the worker's personal Social Security account. 2 Model 3 differs in
this respect from Models 1 and 2. Under Model 3, workers would
choose to contribute an additional 1% of their Social Security payroll
base to their private accounts. 23  The federal government would
provide a matching contribution to the workers' personal accounts of
2.5%, up to a maximum matching contribution of $1,000 annually.24
Each model makes different assumptions concerning the rate of
investment return that will be used to calculate future reductions in
the amount of the worker's traditional Social Security benefits.21
18. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 79-89.
19. See id. at 44-45.
20. Id. at 82.
21. Id. at 83. This $1,000 contribution cap would be indexed annually for wage
growth. Id.
22. See id. at 82-83.
23. Id. at 84. The Commission Report suggests that this additional one percent
contribution be subsidized through a refundable tax credit. See id. at 131.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Each reform model also makes different assumptions concerning whether changes
to the formulas that determine the level of traditional Social Security benefits will be
made. Model 1 makes no changes to the traditional benefit formula. See id. at 14. Model
2 slows the rate of future increases in traditional Social Security benefits by tying these
increases to the lower price inflation index instead of the higher wage growth index used
today. See id. at 120. This proposed index change has been criticized as a significant
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Notably, these assumed rates of investment return used to determine
the reduction in future traditional benefits ("offset rates") are
expressed in real terms, i.e., they already have been adjusted
(reduced) for inflation.26 The offset rates for Models 1, 2 and 3 are
3.5 %,27 2%,28 and 2.5 %,29 respectively.
The Commission's proposed administrative structure for
personal Social Security accounts is complex.3°  An independent
governing board (the "Board"), modeled after the boards of directors
of the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees and the Federal
Reserve Board, would be established to oversee the administration
and regulation of personal Social Security accounts.3 Personal Social
Security accounts would be administered under two systems known as
tiers.32 Initially, personal Social Security accounts would operate
reduction in benefits. See discussion infra note 297. Model 2 also increases the minimum
traditional benefit and spousal benefit. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 120.
Model 3 would reduce future increases in traditional benefits by using an index that is
midway between the wage growth and price inflation indices. See id. at 132. As in Model
2, the minimum traditional benefit and spousal benefits would be increased. See id. In
addition, the early retirement traditional benefit would be reduced, and the late
retirement traditional benefit would be increased. See id.
26. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 74.
27. Id. at 82.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id. at 84.
30. See id. at 44-45.
31. See id. at 60. Although the selection methods for board members of the Thrift
Savings Plan and the Federal Reserve differ, each method is designed to insulate the
board members from outside political pressures. See id.
The governing board for the Thrift Savings Plan consists of five part-time
members. The chairman of the Thrift Savings Plan board is appointed by the President to
serve a four year term. The remaining four board members are chosen in consultation
with the House of Representatives and the Senate. Two of these members are appointed
to three-year terms. The remaining two board members are appointed to two-year terms.
The five members of the board select a full-time executive director, who serves as the chief
executive officer for the Thrift Savings Plan. Funding for the Thrift Savings Plan board is
independent of the President and Congress. See id.
The governing board for the Federal Reserve consists of seven members. The
board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Federal
Reserve board members are appointed to fourteen-year terms. These terms are staggered
so that the opportunity for the President to appoint a new board members arises only once
every two years. Like the Thrift Savings Plan, the funding for the board of the Federal
Reserve is independent of Congress. See id.
32. See id. at 46. The Commission selected this two-tiered approach because in the
Commission's view it offered the best balance between the short-term need to keep
administrative costs low, particularly for small account balances, and the longer-term
benefits of marketplace competition, which operates to provide workers with a variety of
investment choices and higher quality service. See id. at 44-46.
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under a centralized federal government administrator ("Tier I").33
Employers would continue to report and forward worker
contributions for personal accounts to the federal government in the
same manner that employers report and forward Social Security
payroll taxes today under the traditional Social Security system. 4
Until a worker's account balance reached a minimum threshold
amount (the Commission suggests setting this "threshold amount" at
$5,000),"5  the account would be subject to Tier I central
administration.36 The Commission recommends a total of nine mutual
funds as investment options for Tier I accounts.37 The proposed
mutual funds are three balanced funds,38 five index funds patterned
33. See id. at 46. The Tier I structure is modeled after the Thrift Savings Plan for
federal employees. See id.
34. See id. at 47. The Commission Report did not propose to change the current
system of payroll tax reporting and payment by employers in order to avoid increasing
employer compliance costs for personal Social Security accounts. See id. Under the
current system, the Commission estimated that it would take approximately fifteen
months, on the average, before worker contributions would be credited to their personal
accounts. See id. This delay occurs because although employers forward payroll taxes for
their employees to the federal government throughout the year, albeit on varying
schedules, they are not required to identify the individual employees until the end of the
year. Id. at 47 nn.21 & 24. In addition, many smaller employers file payroll tax returns on
paper (which are then processed by the federal government by hand) rather than
electronically. Id. at 47. To avoid lost investment earnings during this period when
payroll tax contributions are reconciled with and credited to individual employees, the
Commission recommended that worker contributions be pooled and invested in
government bonds, with earnings credited to each personal account once the contributions
are credited and distributed to each worker's personal account. See id. The Commission
Report does not address the issue of employer theft of worker contributions to personal
accounts, which has proven problematic in the context of 401(k) plans. See, e.g., Press
Release, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Department
Sues Minnesota Printing Company to Recover Employee Contributions for 401(k) Plan
(July 29, 2002), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/pr072902.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (announcing the filing of a lawsuit against Advanced
Duplicating & Printing, Inc. for $50,098.69 in employee contributions not forwarded to
their 401(k) plan); Press Release, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Labor Department Sues Computer American Training Centers' 401(k) Trustee
(June 7, 2002), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/pr060702.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (announcing the filing of a lawsuit against the trustee of the
401(k) plan for Computer American Training Centers, Inc. for failing to forward
$24,011.69 in employee contributions to the plan); see also Press Release, Pension &
Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Department Recovers $22 Million
for 401(k) Plans and Begins Hotline for Workers (Mar. 31, 1997), at http://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/ebsa/archive/pwb97113.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (noting the success of a Clinton Administration program designed to reduce
misuse of 401(k) contributions).
35. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 51.
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after the five funds offered in the Thrift Savings Plan,39 and one
inflation-protected bond fund.40 To reduce the fees associated with
these mutual funds to a minimum,4 the Commission proposes that
the management services for each fund be auctioned off to competing
private sector mutual fund companies.42 Finally, the Commission
recommends that a "standard" default fund be designated for those
workers who elect to contribute to a personal Social Security account,
but who fail to direct how their account assets should be invested.43
The Commission does not offer a specific recommendation for this
standard fund, but rather suggests broad guidelines.'
38. These three indexed balanced funds would each consist of different proportions of
corporate stocks, corporate bonds, and government bonds to reflect three distinct points
(conservative, medium, and growth) along the investment risk-reward continuum. See id.
at 51.
39. The five index funds offered by Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees are: the
G fund, which specializes in short-term U.S. Treasury securities; the F fund, which is a
bond index fund; the C fund, which holds large company stocks and tracks the Standard &
Poor's 500 Index; the S fund, which holds medium and small company stocks and tracks
the performance of the Wilshire 4500 stock index; and the I Fund, with is invested in the
stock of major corporations located in Australia, Europe and the Far East. See id. at 51 &
n.28.
40. See id. at 51.
41. The significance of mutual fund fees for personal Social Security accounts is
discussed in detail in Part III.A.3 of this Article.
42. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
43. ld. at 52. Because the worker must affirmatively act to move an account out of
Tier I and into Tier II, accounts where no fund has been affirmatively selected by the
worker will remain in Tier I, irrespective of the size of the account balance. Id.
44. The Commission Report states:
For those individuals who fail to choose a Tier-I fund, their contributions must be
invested into a standard fund on their behalf. Empirical evidence suggests that
many participants in private-sector 401(k) plans also base their investment
decisions on the design of the standard fund. It is likely, therefore, that many
participants will look to the standard fund as a benchmark for their own
investment decisions in a Social Security system augmented with personal
accounts. The standard fund, therefore, must be chosen appropriately. If the
standard fund, for example, is too conservative by holding mostly bonds, then
some participants will not be able to enjoy the higher expected returns from a
fund with more stocks. At the same time, the standard fund must be appropriate
for the participant's age, as younger people should invest relatively more in
stocks. The growth balanced fund discussed earlier, therefore, would be an
appropriate standard fund for young workers; the medium fund for middle-age
workers; the conservative fund for older workers. However, the standard fund
must also be consistent with any promises that are made with respect to personal
accounts. If the government, for example, promises that the personal accounts will
produce a minimum return or benefit, provided that the personal account is
invested in a particular balanced fund, then that fund should be the standard.
Id. at 52 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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Once the worker's account balance meets the designated
threshold amount, the worker may elect to invest her account in
mutual funds operated by the private sector ("Tier 1I"1).45 These
private sector mutual funds must "satisfy stringent rules as
determined by the Governing Board. ' 46 The Commission suggests as
criteria that "[t]he funds must be very diversified and reflect the
performance of many companies spanning all major commercial
sectors. Moreover, the share of the fund invested in each corporation
cannot exceed strict limits as established by the Governing Board."47
These criteria indicate that direct investments by workers in the
stocks of individual companies, or investments in relatively narrow
industrial sector funds, such as the high tech or health care industries,
would not be permitted. For both Tier I and Tier II accounts, the
Commission recommends that workers be allowed to change the
allocation of their investments only once a year, but that account
balance information be immediately accessible.48
The Commission Report also addresses the difficult issue of
mutual fund fees and expenses. 49 The funds used as investment
options for Tier I and approved by the Board as investment options
for Tier II accounts must be "no-load" mutual funds."0 Each fund will
be allowed to charge a single annual fee that must be clearly stated as
a percentage of assets.5 The Board will not regulate the maximum
amount of this annual fee, but apparently will consider fees when
selecting fund vendors. 2 Consistent with this policy of avoiding direct
Board regulation of mutual fund fees, the Commission recommends
that the threshold amount for an account to be invested in private
sector Tier II funds should be high enough that "it would be feasible
45. Id. at 46. For a discussion of the Commission's reasons for proposing a two-tiered
system, see supra note 32.
46. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46; see also id. at 53 (explaining that
participants can invest threshold balances and subsequent contributions in the private
sector).
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id. at 48.
49. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
50. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
51. See id. Under current federal securities laws, mutual fund fees are disclosed as a
percentage of fund assets ("expense ratios") in the fund's prospectus, but are broken out
into separate categories. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND
FEES AND EXPENSES §§ II.A.2, III.B.2 (Dec. 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
feestudy.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter SEC FEE
STUDY].
52. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
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for such accounts to be charged low transaction costs without the
need for price caps."53
The Commission recommends a hybrid set of distribution rules
upon retirement. First, the worker must have a minimum level of
income generated by the combination of traditional Social Security
benefits and benefits from the worker's personal account sufficient to
keep the worker (and, if the worker is married, the worker's spouse)
"safely above the poverty line during retirement." 54 The worker has
two methods for satisfying this requirement. The worker may
purchase a traditional annuity from a Board-approved vendor using
the funds in her personal account. The traditional annuity must
generate the level of annual income necessary to supplement her
traditional Social Security benefits and bring the worker's total
benefits up to the Board's minimum retirement income standard.
Alternatively, the worker may effectively "self-annuitize" her
personal account by leaving a Board-determined amount in the
account and gradually withdrawing these funds during retirement
pursuant to a schedule determined by the Board. 6 Any funds
remaining in the worker's account after this minimum retirement
income standard is satisfied may be withdrawn as a lump sum, or left
in the account and bequeathed at the worker's death. 7 If the worker
is married, she must use the funds held in her account to purchase a
two-thirds joint and survivor annuity for the benefit of herself and her
spouse.58 The annual income generated by this joint and survivor
annuity must be sufficient to keep both spouses safely above the
poverty line during retirement. 9 Workers are not allowed to access
the funds held in their accounts prior to retirement, even in instances
of hardship such as disability.6" If the worker dies before attaining
53. Id.
54. Id. at 56. This requirement applies regardless of the worker's other financial
resources. See id.
55. Id. The Board would be responsible for making different types of annuities
available for purchase, presumably through contracts with outside vendors. See id.
56. See id. Retired workers would not be required, however, to make withdrawals
from their personal accounts. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 59. This two-thirds joint and survivor annuity distribution requirement
mimics the current standard for traditional Social Security benefits paid to a surviving
spouse who does not independently qualify for Social Security benefits. See id. The
Commission Report indicates that spouses may agree to waive the two-thirds annuity
distribution rule if they both independently qualify for Social Security benefits and can
each purchase a qualifying single life annuity. See id.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 55. Disabled workers will, however, still qualify for traditional Social
Security disability benefits. See infra notes 296-307, 326 and accompanying text.
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Social Security retirement age, the balance in the worker's account
can be bequeathed to the worker's heirs.6
Under a system of personal Social Security accounts, many
workers will need financial information and education.62 The
Commission proposes that at the Tier I level, the Board will be
primarily responsible for providing "informative" advice to workers.63
The Commission's choice of the term "informative" advice appears to
be an attempt to avoid the fiduciary connotations traditionally
associated under federal retirement laws with a party who offers
investment advice.64  Other government agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or non-profit organizations
may assist the Board in this task.65 At the Tier I level, with its limited
universe of investment options, this approach ensures uniformity in
the quality of informative advice provided to workers.6 Although the
Commission Report does not address expressly who will provide
investment information once a worker transitions to Tier 11,67 this
information would have to come (at least in part) from the private
sector mutual funds themselves.
61. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
62. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 236,
INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS: ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 34-36 (2001)
(describing the general lack of understanding exhibited by many Americans and asserting
that the more freedom participants are given in managing their personal accounts, the
more ongoing education they will need) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES STUDY];
David I. Laibson et al., Self-Control and Saving for Retirement, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY, 1998, at 91, 92 nn.3-4 (using a hyperbolic model to examine under-
saving in the United States); Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 14-
17 (reviewing studies of retirement investment knowledge among the public); Carolyn
Hirschman, Growing Pains, HR MAGAZINE, June 2002, at 31 (discussing human resource
departments' roles in informing employees about 401(k)s); Mike McCarthy & Liz
McWhirter, Are Employees Missing the Picture?, BENEFITS Q., First Quarter 2000, at 25-
31, 2001 WL 1593640 (noting that despite efforts to educate employees, as many as fifty-
seven percent choose to take cash payments from their 401(k)s when changing jobs, rather
than rolling their balance into their new employer's plan); see also K.C. Swanson,
Nebraska Sees Red Over Its 401(k) Plan (May 7, 2002), at http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/
funds/belowradar/10021041.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting
on the abandonment of Nebraska's retirement plan due to employee lack of knowledge
and interest).
63. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46; see also id. at 49 (noting that having
investor information provided by the Board will reduce compliance costs for employers,
improve investor confidence in the objectivity of the information, and ensure the same
quality of investment information across employers).
64. See generally Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 27-30
(reviewing fiduciary duties in the context of ERISA).
65. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 49.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 46, 49.
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II. 401(K) PLANS AS A "TEST CASE" FOR PERSONAL SOCIAL
SECURITY ACCOUNTS
A. Perspective: The Traditional Social Security System and 401(k)
Plans
Federal retirement policy historically has been based on what is
commonly known as the "three-legged stool": (1) the traditional
Social Security system; (2) retirement plans voluntarily sponsored by
private employers; and (3) personal savings.68 Within the private
retirement plan system, the 401(k) plan now dominates. 69  These
three tranches of federal retirement policy historically have been
viewed as distinct, each with its own attributes. Before examining the
similarities and differences between personal Social Security accounts
and 401(k) plans, it is useful to pause and consider how reform
through personal accounts will fundamentally change the nature and
purposes of the first tranche-the traditional Social Security system.
At its core, the traditional Social Security system represents a
policy of paternalism by the federal government.70 Contributions by
employers and employees to the traditional Social Security system are
mandatory, and coverage under the system is nearly universal.7" The
Social Security payroll deduction contribution system essentially
assumes that workers will not adequately save for retirement and
instead compels them to do so.72 This paternalistic policy approach is
also reflected in the nature of traditional Social Security benefits. A
fixed benefit amount is determined by a complex formula based on
earnings.7 3 These monthly benefit payments are made until death.74
Thus, the worker bears no stock market investment or longevity risk.
68. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 852-53 (1987).
69. See PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 16, at Highlights From the
1998 Form 5500 Reports ("Since the early and mid-1980s, the number of 401(k) plans has
grown at a rate that in 15 years has led them to dominate the private pension plan system
by providing primary or supplemental plan coverage to about 70 percent of all pension
plan covered workers.").
70. See generally MICHAEL A. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY:
RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 92-99 (1999) (describing reasons why
persons fail to provide for their own retirement income security).
71. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY 5, 9
(2002) (Sup. Doc. No. SSA1.26:), available at http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/fastfacts/2002/
ff2002.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
72. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
73. See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61
U. PITt. L. REV. 955, 961 (2000).
74. See id. at 962.
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In contrast, 401(k) plans represent a federal government policy
that the individual should be encouraged to bear some of the
responsibility for ensuring his or her own financial security in
retirement.75 The federal government's role essentially is reduced to
encouraging employers to offer 401(k) plans and workers to
voluntarily save for their own retirement by providing an income tax
incentive for them to do so.76 This individual responsibility policy
approach permeates the nature of contributions to and benefits from
401(k) plans.77 Participation in 401(k) plans is voluntary, and the
participant assumes both stock market investment risk and the risk of
longevity. 8
Benefits under the traditional Social Security system and 401(k)
plans also tend to favor different income classes of workers.
Traditional Social Security benefits replace a higher percentage of
wages for low-income workers than for high-income workers.79 In
contrast, the 401(k) plan system favors higher income workers over
lower income workers in several respects. In a 401(k) plan, the
participant voluntarily elects to have the employer deduct a portion
of the worker's present compensation and instead contribute this
amount to the participant's 401(k) plan account."0 Until 2002, as a
practical matter, salary deferral contributions to 401(k) plans were
75. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 43-45, 50-54 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the increased personal responsibility
evident in 401(k) plans as both a positive feature and a drawback of the system); Medill,
Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 9-13 (describing the shift to participant-
directed 401(k) plans as the government shifting financial responsibility for retirement to
the individual); Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided
Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 361, 361-65 (2002) (demonstrating the dangers of participant-directed 401(k)
plans due to the failure of ERISA to adapt to their use).
76. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 75, at 222-23.
77. See id. at 50-54.
78. See id.
79. See GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRIVATE PENSIONS 11-12 (2000) (Sup. Doc. No. GA1.13:HEHS-00-187). Viewed from
the perspective of tax equity, it should be noted that although traditional Social Security
benefits are progressive, the Social Security payroll tax system is highly regressive. See
Graetz, supra note 68, at 865-68.
80. For 2002, the maximum salary deferral contribution amount was $11,000. See
I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(B) (West 2002). Workers over age fifty can make an additional catch-
up contribution in 2002. See id. § 414(v). Federal tax law does impose potential restraints
on the contributions of "highly compensated employees" (as adjusted for inflation, those
earning more than $90,000 annually in 2002), id. § 414(q)(1)(B), in the form of the actual
deferral percentage ("ADP") test. See id. § 401(k)(3). Plans that satisfy the safe harbor
requirements for 401(k) plans and simple 401(k) plans for small employers are exempt
from ADP testing. See id. §§ 401(k)(11)-(12).
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limited to the lesser of a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the
participant's compensation, which enabled many higher income
workers to contribute larger amounts to their 401(k) plan accounts.81
Although this percentage of compensation limit was removed in 2002,
in general, higher income workers with greater amounts of
discretionary income are better positioned financially to defer the
receipt of some current income than lower income workers, who are
more likely to need all of their compensation for immediate
consumption needs.81 In addition, the federal government's income
tax incentive for making contributions to a 401(k) is significantly
more valuable for higher income workers because they are in a higher
marginal income tax bracket than lower income workers. s3
Finally, the traditional Social Security system and 401(k) plans
can differ in purpose for lower and higher income workers. The sole
purpose of the traditional Social Security system is to provide a
81. Prior to the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) ("EGTRRA"), employee elective salary deferrals to a 401(k) plan were treated as
"employer contributions" and therefore subject to the employer deduction limit under
Code section 404(a) of fifteen percent of employee compensation. See I.R.C.
§ 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 616, 115 Stat. at 103; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 220-21 (2001), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 46, 145-46.
Elective salary deferral contributions also were subject to a maximum dollar amount limit.
See I.R.C. § 402(g)(1) (West 2002). After adjustments for inflation, this maximum dollar
amount limit was $10,500 in 2001. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 211, reprinted in 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 135-36. As a practical matter, in order to comply with both of these
restrictions, employers who sponsored 401(k) plans limited employee salary elective
deferral contributions to the lesser of the maximum dollar amount limit of Code section
402(g) or the percentage of compensation limit for employer deductions of Code section
404. EGTRRA added Code section 404(n), which exempts employee elective deferrals to
a 401(k) plan from the employer deduction limit based on a percentage of the employee's
compensation imposed by Code section 404(a)(3). See Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 614(a), 115
Stat. at 102; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 221, reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 146.
New Code section 404(n) is effective for years after December 31, 2001. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 107-84, at 221, reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 146. Post-EGTRRA, employee
elective salary deferral contributions are still subject to a maximum dollar amount limit.
This limit was $12,000 in 2003. I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(B). Participants who qualify as "highly
compensated employees" are subject to additional limitations. See discussion supra note
80.
82. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 238,
CONTRIBUTION BEHAVIOR OF 401(K) PLAN PARTICIPANTS 8-9 (2001); 2000 ASSET
ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 18-19. Federal tax law does impose potential
restraints on the contribution levels of highly compensated employees, see discussion
supra note 80, which is reflected in the study's resultant higher income levels, see
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 238, supra, at 8-9; 2000 ASSET
ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 18-19.
83. For a numerical illustration comparing the economic benefits of income tax
deferral for taxpayers in the fifteen percent and forty percent marginal income tax
brackets, see LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 75, at 229.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
source of income during retirement. This purpose applies universally
to all workers, irrespective of income. For lower income workers,
generally speaking, the purpose of participating in a 401(k) plan is the
same, because persons of modest financial means are likely to
consume the balance of their 401(k) plan accounts during their
retirement years. For higher income workers, however, 401(k) plans
can serve the secondary purpose of facilitating the transfer of wealth
to the next generation.84 Rather than viewing their 401(k) plan
savings as a source of future retirement income, higher income
workers may view the income tax deferral opportunity offered by
their 401(k) plan accounts as a mechanism to accumulate wealth for
future generations.
Taken together, the distinct purposes and societal attributes of
the traditional Social Security system and 401(k) plans can be viewed
as offsetting from the perspective of federal retirement policy. Until
now, Social Security and 401(k) plans have allocated responsibility for
retirement income security between the federal government and the
individual worker. Benefits under the traditional Social Security
program and 401(k) plans also represent a policy determination of
how tax revenues and expenditures should be allocated between the
less affluent and the more affluent workers in American society.85
Viewed in its broadest perspective then, to reform part of the
traditional Social Security system so that it more resembles 401(k)
plans means altering the current policy balance. Who wins and who
loses if the status quo is altered? The answer to this question-the
ultimate policy question-lies in a close examination of the assertions
made by the Commission in support of personal Social Security
accounts. This examination is the subject of Part III of the Article.
B. Similarities Between Personal Social Security Accounts and
401(k) Plans
The fundamental characteristics of 401(k) plans are similar to
those of the administrative structure proposed by the Commission for
84. See The Fall of Enron, How Could it have Happened? Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 96 (2002) (statement of Professor John H.
Langbein, Yale Law School) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.G74/9:S.HRG.107-376) (noting that the
fact that 401(k) account balances are transferable on death encourages employees to
generously contribute).
85. See generally Graetz, supra note 68 (arguing that the current system of federal tax
policy that finances the traditional Social Security system and the private employer
pension system is inequitable).
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personal Social Security accounts. 6 In a typica! 401(k) plan, the
worker voluntarily elects to have her employer contribute a portion
of her compensation to the worker's plan account.87  Like personal
Social Security accounts, typically in a 401(k) plan the participant
directs the investment of the assets in her plan account by choosing
among a set of investment options.8 In the 401(k) plan context, these
investment options are selected by the employer who sponsors the
plan.89  Federal law safeguards the interests of 401(k) plan
participants by imposing general fiduciary duties of prudence and
loyalty upon the employer when it selects the menu of investment
options for the plan.9" Under the Commission's proposal, the
governmental Board will assume the role of the employer in this
important task.9"
Department of Labor regulations governing participant-directed
401(k) plans (the "404(c) Regulations")9 2 require the plan to offer a
broadly diversified range of investment options.93 For almost all
401(k) plans, this diversification requirement is satisfied by offering
workers a variety of mutual funds as investment options.94 The
86. There are, however, key differences between how 401(k) plans are administered
and how personal Social Security accounts are likely to be administered. See
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES STUDY, supra note 62, at 2. Most notably, employers who
sponsor 401(k) plans are subject to rules for depositing participant salary deferral
contributions to their individual 401(k) plan accounts that effectively require the employer
to deposit funds in the account no later than the fifteenth business day of the month
following the month in which the participant's contribution was withheld from her
compensation by the employer. See Definition of "plan assets"-participant
contributions, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(b) (2002). In contrast, under the Commission's
proposed structure, contributions will not be deposited into personal accounts for up to
fifteen months. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. This potential delay
obviously makes the possibility of employer theft problematic.
87. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 2002).
88. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(c) (2002); ERISA section 404(c) plans, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii) (2002); Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 11
& n.51. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that as of 1997, eighty-six percent of
401(k) plans sponsored by medium and large private establishments allowed participants
to direct the investment of their contributions. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997, at 135,
tbl.177 (1999) (Sup. Doc. No. L 2.3/10:) [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS].
89. See Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 485-86.
90. See id. at 482-513 (illustrating application of the duties of prudence and loyalty to
the employer's selection of 401(k) plan investment options).
91. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51, 53.
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1).
93. See id.; see also Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 522-24
(explaining that 404(c) Regulations require an employer to "offer a broad and diversified
range of at least three investment options").
94. See Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 523-24.
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Commission endorses a similar approach to investment
diversification.
The 401(k) plan participant assumes the risk of investment
performance concerning her account." This assumption of
investment risk is significant, because the worker's benefit at
retirement is usually paid in the form of a lump sum representing the
balance of the account.96 Under the three reform models proposed by
the Commission, the worker also assumes the risk of investment
performance. The worker's future traditional Social Security benefits
will be reduced based on the assumption that the account earned a
specified annual average real rate of investment return, ranging from
2.0% to 3.5% for the three models.97
C. Changes from the 401(k) Plan Norm
Several of the Commission's proposed structural features for
personal Social Security accounts differ from the norm in employer-
sponsored 401(k) plans. Specifically, these features concern: (1) the
types of permissible investment options; (2) pre-retirement access to
account funds; (3) the form of distributions from the account at
retirement; (4) the investment criteria for a default investment fund
for workers who do not direct the investment of their account; and (5)
how frequently workers may change investment allocations and
options. Studies of these features in the 401(k) plan context indicate
that the Commission's proposed changes from the 401(k) plan norm
may promote greater investment success for these workers who
choose to contribute to personal Social Security accounts.
1. Permissible Investment Options
The Commission's range of permissible investment options for
both Tier I and Tier II personal accounts differs in two key aspects
from the investment options offered by many 401(k) plans today.
First, many 401(k) plans offer company stock as an investment
option.98 Research of investment behavior by participants in 401(k)
95. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 11.
96. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 137 tbl.182 (reporting that
ninety-one percent of 401(k) plans sponsored by medium and large private establishments
allow for lump sum distributions).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
98. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 4; PATRICK J. PURCELL,
THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANS, at CRS-4
tbl.1 (Jan. 22, 2002), at www.house.gov/boozman/issues/crsrsenron.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); JACK L. VANDERHEI, EBRI SPECIAL REPORT: COMPANY
STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS 4 (Jan. 31, 2002), at http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/iscebs.pdf (on file
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plans shows that when company stock is offered as an investment
option, participants invest heavily in company stock at the expense of
broadly diversified equity mutual funds.9   The Commission
recommends that personal Social Security accounts should not be
invested in the stock of individual companies (including the
employer's company) to ensure investment diversification. 00 One
need look only to the well-publicized example of participants in the
Enron 401(k) plan to see the wisdom of this recommendation as a
matter of federal retirement policy."0'
Second, a growing number of employers today are adding a self-
brokerage feature to their 401(k) plans in addition to the "core" line-
up of mutual funds required by the Department of Labor's 404(c)
Regulations.0 2  The Commission recommends a much more
restrictive form of this self-brokerage approach to permissible
investment options for Tier II accounts. Under the Commission's
approach, only mutual funds are allowed as investment options,
thereby excluding the wide variety of investments offered in self-
brokerage 401(k) plans. Before a private sector mutual fund is
permitted as an investment option for a Tier II account, the fund
must be approved by the Board. 103 The criteria recommended by the
Commission for approval of these Tier II mutual funds indicate that
with the North Carolina Law Review); Daniel Altman, Experts Say Diversify, but Many
Plans Rely Heavily on Company Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 26; Scott Burns,
Employer Stocks Hurt 401(k) Odds, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2002, at 1H.
99. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 8 (stating that participants
in 401(k) plans that offer company stock, but not guaranteed investment contracts, have
"dramatically lower" allocations to equity funds and balanced funds than plans which do
not offer company stock as an investment option); Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive
Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747,
1747-49 (2001).
100. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
101. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Employees' Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron
Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (describing the 401(k) losses of Enron
employees); Jane Bryant Quinn, 401(k)s and the Enron Mess, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002,
at 25 (describing the problems caused by heavy 401(k) investment in employer stock).
102. See Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Research Shows U.S. Employers
Enhancing 401(k) Plans to Cure Common Employee Mistakes (Nov. 5, 2001), at http://
www.401khelpcenter.com/press/pr-hewitt_110501.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (describing a 2001 survey of employers finding that twelve percent offer a
self-directed brokerage account feature, an increase from seven percent in 1999); Clifton
Linton, Self-Directed 401(k)s Expand Investment Choices, (Oct. 17, 2000), at http://www.
mpowercafe.com/retirement/features/features.1.3.1_05082000.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (stating that self-directed 401(k)s offer more investment options
but also require more responsibility and more investment homework and cost more than
traditional investment options).
103. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
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many private sector funds today simply would not qualify, either
because they would not satisfy the Board's broad diversification
requirements, 1°4 or because of their commission and fee structure. 105
Although to date no published studies exist concerning how 401(k)
plan investments in self-brokerage accounts perform, the
Commission's recommendations are consistent with the basic
investment principle of using portfolio diversification to maximize
investment gains and minimize investment losses.
2. Pre-Retirement Access to Account Funds
The Commission's proposed prohibition on pre-retirement
access to account funds differs from the norm in 401(k) plans.10 6 In
the typical 401(k) plan, a participant may elect to take a distribution
of her account upon termination of employment prior to
retirement.10 7 If the terminated participant's account balance is under
$5,000, the employer may "cash out" the account and distribute the
funds to the participant,108 unless the participant elects to do a direct
rollover of the account. 109 Recent studies of the effect of the "cash
out" rule have shown that many workers with account balances under
$5,000 fail to elect a direct rollover."l 0 Instead, these small account
holders are passive and allow the employer to "cash-out" their
retirement savings."' The employer also may design its 401(k) plan
104. See id. at 46, 53.
105. Id. at 46 ("Funds in both Tiers cannot charge sales 'loads' or other marketing fees
on entry or exit.").
106. Under the Commission's proposal, workers would not be able to access the funds
held in their personal Social Security accounts prior to retirement. This restriction on pre-
retirement access to account funds would apply even in instances where the worker has
become disabled prior to retirement. See id. at 55.
107. See JAMES A. CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: PLAN RULES,
PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 13-14, (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8655, 2001), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8655
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE];
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 188, LARGE PLAN LUMP-SUMS:
ROLLOVERS AND CASHOUTS 3 (1997); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE
BRIEF NO. 178, LUMP-SUM DISTRIBUTIONS: FULFILLING THE PORTABILITY PROMISE
OR ERODING RETIREMENT SECURITY? 3 (1996); James M. Poterba et al., Lump-Sum
Distributions from Retirement Savings Plans: Receipt and Utilization, in INQUIRIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF AGING 85, 87 (David A. Wise ed., 1998) (stating that defined contribution
plans typically make lump sum distributions when participants terminate employment
prior to retirement).
108. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (West 2002).
109. See id. § 401(a)(31).
110. See PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 15; Craig Copeland, Lump
Sum Distributions: An Update, EBRI NOTES, July 2002, at 6.
111. See PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 15.
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to allow participants to access account funds in instances other than
termination of employment. The 401(k) plan may allow a participant
to borrow from her plan account,112 or the plan may allow for pre-
retirement withdrawals.'1 3
Allowing 401(k) plan participants to access their account funds
prior to retirement is inconsistent with the objective of saving for
retirement. By withdrawing their account funds, participants forego
the opportunity for compounding pretax investment earnings.114
Nevertheless, participants are accustomed to being able to access
their plan retirement savings prior to retirement. A similar trend is
evident for IRAs. In recent years, Congress has created several
exceptions that allow the owner of the IRA to withdraw the funds
prior to retirement, without tax penalty, for certain specified
purposes.1 5 As personal Social Security accounts grow in size, the
Commission's proposed prohibition on pre-retirement withdrawals,
even in cases of disability, is likely to prove unpopular with workers
who view their personal account contributions as "their" money.
3. Forms of Distributions at Retirement
The form of distribution in 401(k) plans typically is a lump sum
payment of the participant's vested account balance.11 6 In contrast,
the Commission recommends that the worker first must annuitize at
least a portion of her account."7 The amount of the portion to be
annuitized must, when combined with the worker's traditional Social
112. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 137 tbl.181 (noting that
fifty-one percent of 401(k) plans sponsored by medium and large private establishments
allow loans for full-time employees).
113. See id. at 136 tbl.180 (fifty percent of 401(k) plans sponsored by medium and large
private establishments allow withdrawals).
114. See Poterba et al., supra note 107, at 85-86. The Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 641, 115 Stat. 38, 118 (2001)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) ("EGTRRA"), modifies these cash out rules
effective in 2004. Under EGTRRA, employers will be required to rollover account
balances between $1,000 and $5,000 to an IRA established by the employer on behalf of
the participant. Id.
115. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 195, HOw DO
INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS STACK UP? AN EVALUATION USING THE
EBRI-SSASIM2 POLICY SIMULATION MODEL 8 n.18 (1998).
116. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 137 tbl.182 (showing that
ninety-one percent of 401(k) plans sponsored by medium and large private establishments
permit lump sum distributions). In theory, 401(k) plan participants could annuitize their
plan benefits at retirement by using the lump sum payment to purchase an annuity. In
practice, however, 401(k) participants rarely do this because purchasing a private annuity
is costly. See discussion infra Part III.C.
117. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
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Security benefits, be sufficient to leave the worker "safely" above the
poverty income level."' This minimum annuity requirement applies
regardless of the worker's other financial resources.'1 9
The Commission's purpose behind the minimum annuity
requirement is essentially paternalistic. The requirement ensures that
the worker will not have the ability immediately to consume the
assets held in her personal account at the commencement of
retirement. The Commission Report emphasizes that applying this
minimum annuity requirement evenhandedly to all workers,
irrespective of their other financial resources, ensures that workers of
all income levels perceive the personal account system as fair. 20
4. Investment Criteria for Default Fund
The need for the employer to designate a default investment
fund for a participant's 401(k) plan contributions is a recent
phenomenon that coincides with the emergence of the "automatic
enrollment" plan design.'12  In automatic enrollment 401(k) plans,
employers generally select a money market or stable value fund as
the plan's default investment option for participants who fail to
affirmatively designate one. 22 This tendency of employers to select a
safe but low-earning default investment option has been criticized. 23
Over time, the lower earnings produce an account balance at
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. ("[A]llowing wealthier people greater access to their personal retirement
savings account seems like a regressive policy."). I argue in Part III.C of the Article that,
ironically, the Commission's proposed administrative structure for implementing the
minimum annuity requirement is likely to operate to the detriment of many lower income
workers who cannot afford to bear the risk of longevity and therefore must select the
traditional annuity option.
121. See infra discussion Part III.D.
122. See JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DEFAUU EFFECTS
AND 401(K) SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
8651, 2001), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8651 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter DEFAULT EFFECTS]. Employers select a low earning money market
mutual fund as the default investment option for both legal liability and psychological
reasons. An account invested solely in a money market mutual fund is unlikely to ever
experience a loss in terms of actual dollars. As a result, under current federal law it is less
likely that the employer will incur fiduciary liability for its investment decision. See
Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 539-41 (arguing for recognition of
"opportunity losses" by the federal courts in ERISA cases). In addition, the employer
avoids the prospect of disgruntled participants, who might be unhappy if their hard-earned
salary deferral contributions had lost money. In terms of real dollars (i.e., adjusted for the
effects of inflation), of course, the participant's account is losing future purchasing power.
123. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 28-29; Medill, Stock.Market Volatility,
supra note 16, at 539-41.
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retirement that is much less than what the participant would have had
if her contributions were invested in a more volatile, but higher
earning, diversified equity mutual fund.
124
The Commission Report suggests that the default investment
option for personal Social Security accounts (the Commission calls
this the "standard" fund) 125 should not follow the, 401(k) plan norm. I2i
Instead, the standard fund, as envisioned by the Commission, would
be like Goldilocks's porridge-not too conservative, not too
aggressive, but just right for each particular worker's age.2 7 Although
the Commission never attaches the label, it appears that what the
Commission has in mind is equivalent to the so-called "lifecycle"
mutual fund.
121
Because personal Social Security accounts must replace a portion
of the worker's traditional benefits to be paid in the future, the
Commission's choice of an appropriately balanced default investment
option is sound policy in theory. In practice, however, the investment
managers selected by the Board to manage the assets held in the
default investment option will be critical to its success. 129 Their task,
to produce investment returns that satisfy the workers' expectations,
will be a challenging one. The Commission clearly recognizes this
potential problem of satisfying worker expectations. Although
rejecting the concept of a guaranteed rate of investment return
guaranteed by the federal government, 3 ' the Commission explicitly
states that "the standard fund must also be consistent with any
124. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 28-29 (arguing that overly conservative
default fund investment options undermine the long-term accumulation of wealth); Medill,
Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 539-41 (arguing that overly conservative default
investment options in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans result in investment opportunity
losses).
125. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
126. See id.; see also supra note 44 (quoting the Commission's description of the
standard fund).
127. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
128. See Christopher Walker, Should You Choose a Lifestyle Fund? (Jan. 29, 2002), at
http://www.mpowercafe.com/retirement/features/features.1.3.1_11272000.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). In a lifecycle mutual fund, all of the investors have
the same target date for retirement. Id. The fund's investment manager selects and
periodically adjusts the investments held by the fund with this target date in mind,
gradually shifting from a more aggressive mix to a more conservative one as the
retirement target date approaches. Id.
129. More importantly, these investment managers will, by virtue of the large sums of
money under their control, wield significant power in. the marketplace. For a discussion of
how this situation is an inevitable product of the Commission's "voluntary" structure, see
Part III.D of this Article.
130. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 ("The Commission has chosen not
to include guarantees in any of the three plans presented here.").
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promises [of a minimum return or benefit] that are made with respect
to personal accounts." t3t
5. Changing Investment Allocations and Options
The norm in 401(k) plans today is to allow participants to change
their investment allocations and fund options frequently. In
contrast, the Commission proposes that workers be allowed to change
their investment allocations and fund options only one time per
year. 133 The purpose of this restriction is to eliminate "day trading" in
personal accounts, and to encourage workers to select their
investment options carefully for the longer term. 134 The ultimate goal,
of course, is to improve worker investment performance in personal
accounts.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE FOUR "TRUTHS"
Parts I and II of this Article examined the Commission's
proposed administrative structure for personal Social Security
accounts and compared this structure to the norm for 401(k) plans
today. Although Part II found that the Commission's proposed
structure for personal accounts differs in certain areas from the norm
for 401(k) plans, Part II concluded that, fundamentally, personal
Social Security accounts are designed to function like 401(k) plans.
Part III of the Article critically examines the Commission's
findings in support of personal Social Security accounts (the four
"Truths") in light of the research evidence concerning the investment
behavior of participants in 401(k) plans. Where appropriate, Part III
also suggests areas where the Commission's proposed structure
should be modified in light of the 401(k) plan research evidence.
131. Id. at 52.
132. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 126 tbl.157. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, forty-seven percent of savings and thrift plans sponsored by
medium and large private establishments place no restrictions whatsoever on a
participant's ability to change investments. Id.
133. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, a "one change per year" rule exists in only two percent of savings and thrift
plans sponsored by medium and large private establishments. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 126 tbl.157.
134. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
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A. Truth #1: Workers Will Be Better Off, in Terms of Total Benefits,
with Personal Social Security Accounts
One of the most appealing aspects of personal Social Security
accounts is their potential to generate greater investment returns
through the stock market."' Advocates for personal Social Security
accounts often point to theoretical market indices, such as the
Standard and Poor's 500 ("S&P 500"), as evidence of what workers
could earn through private Social Security accounts.136  The
implication, of course, is that the investment returns from private
Social Security accounts will generate comparable investment returns.
Viewed against the rather spectacular investment returns of the S&P
500 in recent years,'37 by contrast, workers who have "invested" in
Social Security's traditional benefits will not receive their "money's
worth."'38 Putting these two arguments together, the Commission
135. A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll conducted November 26-27, 2001, found that
popular support for individual Social Security accounts was not affected by the downturn
in the stock market in 2001 or by the tragedy of September 11th. Sixty-four percent of
those surveyed favored individual Social Security accounts, the same general level of
public support as before the 2000 presidential election. Susan Page, Why Social Security
Reform Is Dead, For Now, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2001, at 1A. In contrast, a more recent
poll, taken in August of 2002 by the Alliance for Retired Americans, found that nearly
seventy percent of Americans over age sixty strongly oppose personal Social Security
accounts that would permit individuals to invest in stocks and bonds. Fred Brock, Social
Security and the Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 3, at 8.
136. The co-chairs of the Commission use a similar approach, citing as an example the
annual compound rates of return for three funds used as investment options for the Thrift
Savings Plan for federal employees. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
137. E.g., Chelsea Emery, Stock Boom is Likely to Keep Rolling Along, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000, at 61, 2000 WL 6662814 ("U.S. stocks as measured by the Standard &
Poor's 500 index have returned an average of 18 percent annually since the end of 1981; in
the second half of the 1990s, that growth accelerated to 28 percent annually, well over
twice the long-term average.").
138. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (Under the traditional system, a
single male worker born in 2000 with average earnings will have a real annual return of
0.86% on his scheduled contributions to Social Security). It was the 1994-1996 Social
Security Advisory Council's report that first broke new .political ground by highlighting
this "money's worth" issue. This report concluded:
One of the concerns that most members of the Council had in considering
various policy options was that for many ... future ... retirees these projected
rates of return are quite low relative to the rates of return that these workers
could achieve if they invested in financial assets widely available in the national
economy.... In other words, all but the lowest-wage workers ... could expect
higher real rates of return, on average, by investing their payroll tax
contributions in widely available financial instruments than they could expect
from Social Security under current law.
1 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE 1994-1996
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 41 (1997) (Sup. Doc. No. SSA1.2:AD9/v.1/
994-96). Professor Patricia E. Dilley has criticized this money's worth argument for
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arrives at Truth #1: Workers will be better off, in terms of total
benefits, with personal Social Security accounts. 139
1. The Commission's Investment Assumptions
In support of Truth #1, the Commission provides several
illustrations comparing how low-, medium-, and high-income workers
would fare under the traditional Social Security benefit system and a
reformed system of personal accounts. 140  Significantly, these
illustrations, which show that workers of all income groups would
receive greater total benefits under a personal account system,
assume that the worker's account would earn an average annual real
rate of return of 4.6%,'141 a rate considerably more than the offset
rates for the three models. 142 To support this assumed 4.6% real rate
of return, the Commission makes several investment assumptions.
First, the Commission assumes that the worker will invest in a
portfolio that consists of 50% equity mutual funds, 30% corporate
bond mutual funds, and 20% government bond mutual funds.143 This
prescribed investment allocation is central to the Commission's
projections, all of which are based on a 4.6% average annual real rate
of investment return.4 4 The Commission justifies using a 4.6% annual
average rate of investment return by assuming that the equity mutual
fund portion of the worker's account will earn an average annual real
rate of return of 6.5 %. 145 The corporate bond mutual fund and
privatization as flawed because it ignores the social and institutional policy goals served by
the program. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 1050-53; Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of
Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and
Social Security, 30 LOY. L. REV. 1063, 1185 (1997).
139. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
140. See id. at 87-89. These comparative illustrations have been criticized because for
workers retiring in 2052 they use as a basis for comparison the benefit amount the Social
Security system is projected to be able to pay if no fiscal reforms are enacted, rather than
using the currently scheduled benefit amounts. See id.; see also PETER A. DIAMOND &
PETER R. ORSZAG, REDUCING BENEFITS AND SUBSIDIZING INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLANS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TO
STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY 14 (2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/6-18-02socsec.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting Alan Greenspan's recent assertion that
"a pattern of no action for nearly four decades followed by a closing of the imbalance that
emerges when the Social Security Trust Fund is exhausted entirely through sharp benefit
cuts-which is what the 'payable benefits' baseline assumes-simply will not be allowed to
occur").
141. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 98.
142. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
143. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
144. Id.
145. See id. To evaluate whether the Commission's assumed 6.5% rate of return is
realistic, it is important to recall that the Commission's investment assumptions are based
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government mutual fund portions of the account are assumed to earn
average annual real rates of return of 3.5% and 3.0% respectively.146
Second, the Commission assumes that the worker will rebalance her
account portfolio annually to maintain the perceived 50/50 ratio of
equity and bond funds.147  Third, in its primary results the
Commission assumes that at retirement the worker will use the entire
balance of her account to purchase a variable annuity that will
continue to earn a 4.6% annual rate of real return during the worker's
retirement years until death.14 8
This section of the Article examines two important aspects of the
Commission's underlying assumptions concerning the investment
performance of workers under a personal Social Security account
system. Under the Commission's investment assumptions, the
investment allocation decisions of workers are central to the financial
success of personal Social Security accounts. Each worker's
investment mix will determine the investment returns generated by
her Social Security account. This section of the Article begins by
examining the results of the Employee Benefit Research Institute
("EBRI") study of the investment allocation choices made by
individual participants in 401(k) plans. 149 Examining individual level
data, rather than averages for a group as a whole, is particularly
important from a policy perspective. Under a personal account
system, an individual worker will not receive the "average"
investment returns from all private Social Security accounts. Rather,
she will receive what her individual Social Security account actually
on a real rate of return, i.e., one that has already been adjusted (reduced) for inflation.
For example, during the period 1984 through 2000, inflation averaged 3.23% annually.
DALBAR INC., QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR STUDY, 2001
UPDATE 16 (2001). For an "apples-to-apples" comparison of the Commission's assumed
rate of return with the rates of return reported by the media (which are typically not
reduced for inflation), it is necessary to adjust (increase) the Commission's 6.5% figure for
inflation. Using, for purposes of illustration, the 3.23% inflation figure for the period 1984
through 2000, this would result in a historical rate of return of 9.73%. It is this higher
figure that provides the appropriate "apples-to-apples" comparison for the typical worker
to make with reports of the stock market performance on the nightly news. Experts have
criticized the Commission's 6.5% assumed average annual real rate of investment return
for equity mutual funds as unrealistically optimistic. See Elizabeth Harris, Gearing Up for
Lower Expectations, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 3, at 7; Letter from Dean Baker, Co-
Director of the Social Security Information Project, to Steve Gross, Chief Actuary of the
Social Security Administration (June 14, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
146. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 98.
149. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 3-4.
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earns.150  The EBRI study found that although the investment
portfolio of the average 401(k) plan participant was invested
predominately in equities, 15 there were wide variances in the
investment allocation decisions of individual 401(k) plan
participants. 52 This research shows that significant numbers of 401(k)
plan participants are not diversified, resulting in investment portfolios
that are either exposed to excessive levels of investment risk, or are
likely to generate very low investment returns.'53
The second (but easily overlooked) factor in determining the
investment performance of personal Social Security accounts is the
fees charged by the mutual funds who provide the investment options
for worker accounts. These mutual fund fees reduce the fund's
overall rate of investment return.54 Since 1998, the fees being
charged by mutual fund companies to their investors have come
under increasing scrutiny, first by the Department of Labor in the
context of 401(k) plans,'55 and more recently by the General
Accounting Office'56 and the Securities and Exchange Commission.'57
These studies strongly suggest that lawmakers should reconsider the
Commission's determination that direct regulation by the Board of
the level of mutual fund fees charged is unnecessary, and that mere
disclosure of fees to workers will provide sufficient protection.'58
150. Feldstein and Ranguelova have suggested that individuals could purchase pension
collars to protect against the risk of investment loss in personal accounts. The pension
collar would guarantee a minimum annuity payment in exchange for foregoing some
portion of the account's investment returns above a specified level. See MARTIN
FELDSTEIN & ELENA RANGUELOVA, ACCUMULATED PENSION COLLARS: A MARKET
APPROACH TO REDUCING THE RISK OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W7861, 2000), at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w7861 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
151. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 6.
152. See id. at 12 tbl.7.
153. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
155. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT
401(K) PLAN FEES... FOR EMPLOYEES (1998) [hereinafter 401(K) FEES].
156. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES, ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE
COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION (2000) (Sup. Doc. No. GA1.13:GGD-00-126)
[hereinafter GAO FEE STUDY]; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC'S REPORT PROVIDES
USEFUL INFORMATION ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND RECOMMENDS IMPROVED FEE
DISCLOSURE (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. GA1.13:GAO-01-655R) [hereinafter GAO FEE
STUDY REPLY].
157. See supra note 51.
158. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
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2. The EBRI Study
The EBRI Study is a joint project of the Employee Benefit
Research Institute and the Investment Company Institute ("ICI"). 159
EBRI and ICI have developed a database of 35,367 401(k) plans, with
11.8 million active participants and $579.8 billion in assets.160 The
database covers about 33% of all 401(k) plan assets and 28% of all
401(k) plan participants in the United States.6 1  The database is
designed to be representative of the universe of 401(k) plans and
covers a wide range of plan sizes.62 Findings of the study have been
reported previously for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.163 The discussion
below addresses the results of the study reported for 2000. The
findings for prior years are similar to the 2000 study results."6 The
EBRI Study found that, on the average, approximately 51% of the
average 401(k) plan account balance was invested in equity mutual
funds and 19% was invested in company stock.65 The remaining
average plan account balance was invested 10% in guaranteed
investment contracts, 7% in "balanced mutual funds," 5% in bond
mutual funds, 4% in money market mutual funds, and 1% in other
"stable value" mutual funds.166 If investments in employer stock are
included in the equity securities category, approximately 70% of all
401(k) plan balances are invested, either directly or indirectly, in
equity securities. 67
The Commission refers to this average 70% figure from the 1999
edition of the EBRI Study favorably in support of the assumption
that the hypothetical worker will maintain 50% of her personal
account invested in equity mutual funds, 30% in corporate bond
159. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 3. The Employee Benefit
Research Institute ("EBRI") is a non-profit public policy research organization. Id. at 24
n.2. The Investment Company Institute ("ICI") is the national trade association for the
mutual fund industry in the United States. Id. at 25 n.3.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 3, 6.
163. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 230, 401(K) PLAN
ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 1999 4 n.4 (2001)
[hereinafter 1999 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY].
164. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 4.
165. Id. at 8 chart 3.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 6. When the equity portion of balanced funds also are included, on
average the 401(k) plan participants in the EBRI Study had seventy-five percent of their
account balances invested in equity securities. See id.
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mutual funds, and 20% in government bond mutual funds.6 The
Commission's reliance on these average asset allocation figures from
the EBRI Study, however, is potentially misleading in two respects.
First, the Commission ignores the clear caveat contained in both the
1999 and 2000 editions of the EBRI Study: "Among individual
participants, the allocation of account balances to equity funds varies
widely around the average of 51% for all participants." '169 Second,
under the Commission's proposed administrative structure for
personal accounts, for obvious (post-Enron) reasons the stock of any
individual company, including employer stock, is prohibited as an
investment option. 7' It is the inclusion of employer stock in the
"equity" investment category that results in the 70% figure cited by
the Commission.171
Examining the investment allocation decisions of individual plan
participants, and excluding employer stock as an investment option,
reveals a much different picture. This individual level data from the
EBRI Study is summarized in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1. Percentage of Account Allocated
to Equity Funds by Age 172
Age (0%) (<20%) (20%-80%) (>80%)
20s 28.3% 4.3% 35.1% 32.4%
30s 23.5% 5.4% 37.4% 33.7%
40s 26.0% 6.6% 37.9% 29.5%
50s 29.9% 7.5% 36.5% 26.1%
60s 41.9% 8.0% 30.8% 19.2%
The data presented in Table 1 indicate that the Commission's
hypothetical worker investment portfolio is truly hypothetical. 73 In
168. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 97; 1999 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY,
supra note 163, at 10.
169. 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 11 (finding that fifty-one
percent of average 401(k) plan account balance invested in equity funds); 1999 ASSET
ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 163, at 14 (reporting that fifty-one percent of average
401(k) plan account balance invested in equity funds).
170. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
171. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 4; 1999 ASSET
ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 163, at 10.
172. The data presented in Table 1 are taken from the 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION
STUDY, supra note 16, at 12 tbl.7.
173. The EBRI Study data is consistent with what financial advisors have long
known-investors do not consistently rebalance their portfolios. See Karen Damato, Time
For A Portfolio Trick: Rebalancing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2002, at C1.
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particular, the investment allocation decisions of some younger
workers in the EBRI study are quite revealing. Although
approximately one-third of workers in their twenties were more than
80% invested in equity funds, more than one-fourth of workers in this
age group were not invested in equity funds at all.'74 This general
pattern was similar for workers in their thirties. 75 Table 1 also
reveals the potential for some workers who are nearing retirement to
suffer significant losses. Almost one-fifth of workers in their sixties
(19.2%) remained more than 80% invested in equity funds and,
consequently, exposed to the short term volatility of the stock
market.176 Interestingly, this percentage of workers in their sixties
whose 401(k) accounts were invested more than 80% in equity funds
declined only slightly from 1999,177 despite the single largest annual
decline in 2000 by the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000 market indices in
nearly twenty years.'78 This investment allocation pattern may reflect
an intent by older higher income workers to use their 401(k) plan as a
mechanism for intergenerational wealth transfer rather than to
provide a source of income during retirement. Alternatively, it may
simply reflect a high degree of confidence that, given the market's
strong showing throughout the late 1990's, the stock market would
quickly recover.
Table 2 below, which reflects investment allocation decisions by
the salary of the participant, reveals more patterns indicating how
workers might fare under a personal Social Security account system.
TABLE 2. Percentage of Account Allocated
to Equity Funds by Salary'79
Salary 0% < 20% 20%-80% > 80%
$20,000-$40,000 29.6% 8.8% 40.1% 21.5%
$40,000-$60,000 26.6% 8.6% 40.8% 24.0%
$60,000-$80,000 17.8% 9.0% 45.8% 27.3%
$80,000-$100,000 14.5% 8.3% 45.9% 31.3%
> $100,000 14.8% 8.4% 44.1% 32.7%
174. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 12 tbl.7.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. (showing that 20.6% of workers in their sixties had 401(k) plan account
balances that were more than 80% invested in equity funds).
178. See id. at 3, 25 n.5. During 2000, the S&P 500 was down 10%, and the Russell
3000 fell about 9%. See id. at 25 n.5.
179. The data presented in Table 2 are taken from the 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION
STUDY, supra note 16, at 12 tbl.7.
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Because salary level tends to correlate with age, it is not possible
to use the data presented in Table 2 to draw definitive conclusions
concerning how lower income workers (represented here by the
lowest range reported in the EBRI Study, the $20,000 to $40,000
salary range group) might invest their personal Social Security
accounts. Table 2 does show, however, that over one-fourth of
participants in this lowest salary range were not invested in equity
funds at all. 80
These data illustrate a crucial policy question. Do lower-income
workers, as a group, invest more conservatively than the population
of workers as a whole? Some preliminary evidence to date indicates
that they might.' 81  Generally speaking, investment performance
correlates strongly with education, and education correlates strongly
with income levels.'82 Social Security's traditional benefit structure is
designed to favor lower income workers by replacing a higher portion
of their wages than for higher income workers. 183 If lower-income
workers have lower investment returns from their personal accounts
than higher-income workers, this redistributive function of the
traditional Social Security system, and the social safety net it
provides, will be undermined.
The possibility also exists that the EBRI Study provides an
overly optimistic indicator of how very low-income workers would
invest their personal Social Security account assets. Participants in
traditional 401(k) plans are a self-selected group who earn wages and
salaries at levels sufficient to provide a measure of discretionary
income. The lowest-earning category of 401(k) plan participants
measured in the 2000 EBRI Study earned between $20,000 and
$40,000 annually.184 In contrast, the Commission estimates that,
under the nearly universal coverage of the Social Security system,
twenty-eight million American workers had annual wages and salaries
below $5,000 in 2000.185 How workers in this lowest-income group
would choose to invest their personal accounts is simply unknown. It
is not far-fetched, however, to predict that workers who earn little
180. See id.
181. See Brown et al., supra note 8, at 650 (collecting various studies); Schmall, supra
note 8, at 125-27; Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Investment Without Education: The Disparate
Impact on Women and Minorities in Self-Directed Defined Contribution Plans, 5
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 223,238-44 (2001).
182. See Moore, Partial Privatization, supra note 8, at 354-66; Schmall, supra note 8, at
125-27.
183. See Soc. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 9, at 3; Moore, supra note 73, at 965.
184. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 12 tbl.7.
185. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
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and save little will prefer the perceived security of low-earning United
States government bond funds over the volatility and short-term
investment losses of equity funding. This is particularly true for
workers who do not appreciate the perceived effects of inflation.
In summary,. the EBRI Study indicates that, unlike the
Commission's hypothetical worker, the investment behavior of
individual workers is likely to vary widely from the "ideal" 50%
equity fund, 30% corporate bond fund, and 20% government fund
personal account portfolio. The EBRI Study sharply contradicts the
underlying assumptions about worker investment behavior that lead
to the Commission's projections that all workers will be better off, in
terms of total Social Security benefits, with personal Social Security
accounts.
Can the investment behavior evidenced in the EBRI Study be
modified through a Board-provided program of "informative"
advice? 86 Advocates for personal accounts argue that under a
personal account system workers will become more educated about
investing, and that as a consequence they will modify their investment
and savings decisions accordingly. This argument, which is Truth #2,
is addressed in the next section of Part III of the Article.
3. Government Studies of Mutual Fund Fees
Investment allocation and the resulting investment performance
will not be the sole determinate of the balance in a worker's personal
Social Security account available to pay benefits at retirement.
Another important factor will be the fees deducted from the account
for investment management and administrative services. In 1998, the
Department of Labor issued the results of a study of the mutual fund
fees and expenses being charged to participants in 401(k) plans. 87 As
a direct result of this study, the Department of Labor initiated a
public education program for both 401(k) plan participants and
sponsoring employers concerning the adverse impact of fees on the
accumulation of retirement assets in 401(k) plans.188 More recently,
the issue of mutual fund fees has been studied by both the General
Accounting Office ("GAO")'89 and the Securities and Exchange
186. See id. at 46, 49.
187. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF
401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES (1998), at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kRept.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter DOL FEE STUDY].
188. 401(K) FEES, supra note 155.
189. GAO FEE STUDY, supra note 156; GAO FEE STUDY REPLY, supra note 156.
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Commission ("SEC"). 90 Both the GAO and SEC studies conclude
that the requirements for disclosure of mutual fund fees need to be
changed so that investors can understand and compare mutual fund
fees when making investment decisions. 9' The GAO and SEC
studies disagree, however, on how to change the format for disclosure
of mutual fund fees to remedy this problem. 92
The potential adverse impact of mutual fund fees on the growth
of assets held in personal Social Security accounts is illustrated by the
following example, published by the Department of Labor's public
education booklet, A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees:
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until
retirement and a current 401(k) account balance of $25,000.
If returns on investments in your account over the next 35
years average 7 percent and fees and expenses reduce your
average returns by 0.5 percent, your account balance will
grow to $227,000 at retirement, even if there are no further
contributions to your account. If fees and expenses are 1.5
percent, however, your account balance will grow to only
$163,000. The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses
would reduce your account balance at retirement by 28
percent.'93
The example illustrates the potential adverse effect of mutual fund
fees over time on personal Social Security accounts. Higher expenses
represent lost investment opportunity costs, the cumulative effect of
which is greatly magnified over time.'94
In the 401(k) plan context, fees generally fall into three
categories: plan administration fees; investment management fees;
and fees for individualized services."' Two of these categories,
administrative fees and investment management fees, will apply to
personal Social Security accounts. 96
Administrative fees cover the costs of the daily operation of the
account, such as record keeping, reporting, accounting, and trustee
services. 97 For 401(k) plans, administrative fees are relatively small;
190. SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51.
191. See infra notes 218-45 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 218-45 and accompanying text.
193. 401(K) FEES, supra note 155, at 2 (emphasis added).
194. See DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 1.
195. See 401(K) FEES, supra note 155, at 4-5.
196. Individual service fees are charged to participants who use optional 401(k) plan
features, such as plan loans or pre-retirement withdrawal, that will not be allowed under
the Commission's proposed administrative structure for personal Social Security accounts.
See 401(K) FEES, supra note 155, at 5; supra note 60 and accompanying text.
197. See 401(K) FEES, supra note 155, at 4.
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investment management fees represent the largest component of fees
and expenses.198 Under the Commission's proposed administrative
structure for personal Social Security accounts, the same is likely to
be true. At the Tier I level, administrative fees (the Commission
Report uses the term "transaction costs") will be minimized through
the use of a central administrator.'99 At the Tier II level, however, the
Commission's recommended fee structure for Tier II private sector
mutual funds merges the issue of administrative fees with the far
more significant issue of investment management fees.
In the 401(k) plan context, investment management fees are
estimated to represent between 75% to 90% of the total fees and
expenses charged to 401(k) plans. 00 Investment management fees are
paid to the investment manager of the mutual fund for managing and
investing the assets of the mutual fund.z0' These fees are charged as a
percentage of the assets held in the mutual fund (the "expense ratio"
in the above example),2 2 and are deducted directly from mutual fund
assets.203 Although investment management fees are not deducted
directly from each participant's account, these fees represent an
indirect "charge" in the sense that the investment management fees
reduce the level of investment returns generated by the mutual
fund.2 4
Under the Commission's proposed administrative structure for
personal accounts, mutual fees will not be regulated directly by the
Board. Both Tier I and Tier II mutual funds will be allowed to charge
only a single annual fee, expressed as an expense ratio.205 At the Tier
I level, the Board's competitive selection process for qualifying
mutual funds and their investment managers should operate to
reduce fees to a minimum.20 6 It is primarily at the Tier II level, where
198. DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 3.6.
199. The Commission assumes administrative costs of thirty basis points (0.3 percent of
the account balance) in its projections of low-, medium-, and high-income worker benefits
under a personal account system. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
200. GAO FEE STUDY, supra note 156, at 26-27 ("The largest component of a fund's
total expense ratio usually is the management fee, which is the ongoing charge paid to the
investment adviser for managing the fund's assets and selecting its portfolio of
securities.").
201. See DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 3.3.4.
202. See SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51, § III.B.1.
203. See DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 3.4.3.
204. See 401(K) FEES, supra note 155, at 4-5.
205. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
206. See id. at 51 ("Fund management services would be auctioned off to several
private-sector providers in order to provide low fees and to avoid any single fund manager
holding too much money.").
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workers are offered the opportunity to invest their accounts in private
sector mutual funds approved by the Board, that several recent
government studies strongly suggest that the Commission's reluctance
to directly regulate mutual fund fees or significantly change the
current system of disclosure is problematic.
In 1998, the Department of Labor publicly called attention to the
significance of mutual fund fees in its commissioned report, Study of
401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses ("DOL Fee Study").2 °7 The DOL Fee
Study found that the amounts being charged as fees and expenses for
401(k) plans varied greatly. 08 Several possible reasons for these wide
discrepancies in fees and expenses among 401(k) plans were
discussed. First, fees and expenses were not clearly disclosed to plan
sponsors.0 9 Indeed, the DOL Fee Study noted that there were at
least eighty different ways in which fees and expenses were being
charged to 401(k) plans.210 Second, the general market for 401(k) plan
services was not efficient in the sense that it was "difficult to
impossible" for employers to obtain information about the universe
of potential plan service providers and compare the fees and expenses
charged.' This was in part a function of the lack of standardization
and disclosure of fees.2"2 Finally, a third reason given for variations in
fees was that larger 401(k) plans enjoyed a competitive advantage in
negotiating lower prices. 13
The Commission's requirement that Tier II mutual funds may
charge only one standardized fee, expressed as an expense ratio,
207. See DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 1.
208. See id. § 4.2.
209. See id. § 3.7. Although some of these criticisms in the DOL Fee Study were
directed at investment products other than mutual funds, see id. § 2.4.2 (stable value
accounts); § 2.4.3 (company stock); § 2.5.1 (insurance products), the DOL Fee Study noted
that even among mutual funds investment management fees varied greatly. See id. § 4.2.1.
This occurred despite the fact that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
mandates and regulates disclosure of fees charged by mutual fund investment managers.
See id. § 3.4.3; Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 38-46 (discussing
mutual fund fees in the context of federal regulation of employer-sponsored retirement
plans). Despite SEC regulation of the amounts and mandated disclosure, only eight
percent of mutual fund investors understand the fees they are charged. See SEC
Commissioner Paul R. Carey, Social Security Privatization (Jan. 31, 2001), at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/ spch459.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Press
Release, Invesmart, Invesmart Estimates That Three-Quarters of Retirement Plan
Sponsors Are Unaware of "Hidden Fees" (Nov. 2, 2001), at http://www.invesmart.com/
press-room/press/releases/ release_110201.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter Invesmart Press Release].
210. See DOL FEE STUDY, supra note 187, § 3.7.
211. See id. § 2.7.4.
212. See id. § 3.7.
213. See id. § 4.4.
[Vol. 81
SOCIAL SECURITY AND 401(K) PLANS
addresses many of the problems originally identified in the DOL Fee
Study. In mandating a standard fee disclosure format rather than
proposing to regulate the fees chargeable by Tier II mutual funds
directly, the Commission has chosen to rely on the market itself to
regulate the level of Tier II mutual fund fees. Recently, however, the
popular press, 214 industry insiders,215 the General Accounting
Office,216 and the Securities and Exchange Commission itself2 7 have
questioned the effectiveness of marketplace regulation of mutual
fund fees.
In June of 2000, the General Accounting Office released a study
of trends in mutual fund fees ("GAO Fee Study"). 218 This study was
conducted at the request of several committees of Congress.219 The
GAO Fee Study found that marketplace competition in the mutual
fund industry does not focus directly on fees, but rather on fund
investment returns.2 ' Fund investment returns only indirectly reflect
the cost of mutual fund fees, which are deducted from the fund's
assets before investment returns are calculated. 2 1 Although federal
securities laws require that the fees be disclosed in the fund's
prospectus and annual and semi-annual reports,222 the GAO noted
that prior research studies conducted by the SEC itself had found that
mutual fund investors do not pay attention to, or understand, the
impact of mutual fund fees on fund investment performance. 23 The
GAO noted that the SEC's own research showed that "fewer than
one in six fund investors understood that higher expenses can lead to
lower returns," and "about 40 percent of fund investors surveyed
214. See Scott Burns, From Your Pocket, Into Managers', DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 25, 2001, at H1; Scott Burns, Fund Companies Often Outshine Their Products,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 29, 1998, at D1, 1998 WL 13106450; Scott Burns,
Managers' Fees Can Add up to Big Losses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001, at
DI; Tom Kalbrener, Opinion: 401(k) Plan Fees Are Unfair, PLAN SPONSOR, Dec.-Jan.
1998, at 60-61.
215. John C. Bogle, After the Fall: What's Next for the Stock Market and the Mutual
Fund Industry? (Mar. 21, 2001), at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle-site/march2l200l.html
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); John C. Bogle, Mutual Fund Directors:
The Dog That Didn't Bark (Jan. 28, 2001), at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle-site/
january282001.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). John C. Bogle is the
founder of the Vanguard Group. Id.
216. See GAO FEE STUDY, supra note 156, at 7; GAO FEE STUDY REPLY, supra note
156, at 3-4.
217. See SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51, § IV; Carey, supra note 209.
218. GAO FEE STUDY, supra note 156.
219. See id. at 4.
220. See id. at 62-64.
221. See id. at 63-64.
222. See id. at 66-70.
223. See id. at 72-74.
2003]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
believed incorrectly that a fund's annual operating expenses have no
effect on its gains." '224 The GAO Fee Study identified as a potential
source of investor ignorance the fact that mutual fund fees are
deducted automatically by the fund and not reported as a separate
"expense" to the investor. 25 As one industry expert quoted in the
GAO Fee Study stated, "[n]o one sends the investor a bill, and the
fund simply quietly and continually deducts its fees. The result is that
the information [fee disclosures in the prospectus and annual and
semi-annual reports] is ignored." '226
The GAO Fee Study found that market conditions in the mutual
fund industry may not be sufficiently competitive to reduce mutual
fund fees.227 The GAO Fee Study described the mutual fund industry
as exhibiting the characteristics of a monopolistically competitive
market, where "products" (mutual funds) are differentiated by
quality or services. 28 In a monopolistically competitive market, firms
can charge different "prices" (the investment manager fee) for their
products because each product is promoted to consumers as unique.229
In the mutual fund industry, fund marketing strategy promotes each
mutual fund as unique due to the fund's particular investment
strategy, a strategy designed and implemented by the fund's
investment manager(s).2 0  The GAO Fee Study found that the
potential for fund differentiation, with its accompanying reduction in
fee competition, was greatest among actively traded equity mutual
funds.23' In essence, the wider range of investment returns among
equity mutual funds (before the deduction of investment manager
224. Id. at 73. It is unclear whether anyone at the GAO or the SEC, in reviewing the
results of this research, considered whether very small investors were being rationally
ignorant in foregoing the time it would take to understand, investigate, and compare the
fees charged by mutual fund companies.
225. See id. at 13, 75-78.
226. Id. at 76.
227. See id. at 64-65.
228. See id. at 56-65. There is some indirect evidence, however, that competition on
the basis of fees may exist in the market for no-load mutual funds. For example, the
Vanguard Group, the mutual fund industry's second largest company in terms of assets
under management and the industry's leader in offering low-cost mutual funds, may soon
surpass the industry leader, Fidelity Investments. See Aaron Lucchetti, Can Vanguard
Group Outgrow No. I Fidelity?, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2002, at C1.
229. See GAO FEE STUDY, supra note 156, at 56-57.
230. See id. at 62.
231. See id. at 63 ("The chairman of one mutual fund firm stated that although price
competition exists among money market and bond funds, for which the impact of
operating expense fees [on fund investment returns] was much more obvious, stock funds
were not subject to nearly as much price competition.").
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fees) served to mask variances in the levels of investment manager
fees.
23 2
To increase investor awareness of mutual fund fees and to
promote greater fee competition, the GAO Fee Study recommended
that mutual fund investors receive "personalized" mutual fund fee
statements along with their quarterly investment returns.233 These
personalized fee statements would show the actual dollar amount that
was deducted from the investor's returns due to mutual fund fees.234
In short, mutual fund investors would receive a "bill" for the services
of the fund's investment manager.
Not surprisingly, the SEC responded with its own study of trends
in mutual fund fees in December of 2000 ("SEC Fee Study").235 The
SEC's results were inconclusive as to whether the overall cost of
investing for mutual fund shareholders had been increasing or
decreasing over the period 1979-1999.236 The SEC Fee Study was not
inconclusive, however, in its response to the GAO's call for quarterly
personalized fee bills. Although the SEC agreed that mutual fund
investors needed to be better educated and informed concerning
mutual fund fees,237 the SEC objected to personalized fee bills on the
grounds that it would be difficult and costly to change the structural
methods by which mutual funds are marketed and administered in the
ways that would be necessary to produce personalized fee
statements.2 38  The SEC instead proposed that mutual fund fees
should continue to be disclosed using a table showing the costs in
232. See id. at 63. The GAO Fee Study notes that mutual fund industry officials
offered two potential explanations for the wider range of fees charged by equity mutual
funds. First, the wider range of investment returns from equity funds made fees less
relevant to investors, who are concerned with investment performance. Second, a talented
investment manager can justify a higher fee by producing higher than average investment
returns. See id.
233. See id. at 97-98. Lower cost alternative disclosure methods were also suggested.
See id.
234. See id.
235. SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51.
236. The SEC found that although mutual fund operating expense ratios had increased
since 1979, the sales commissions ("loads") charged to investors had declined over time
with the growth of "no-load" mutual funds. Because sales commissions are not included
in operating expense ratios, this shift made it difficult to compare operating expense ratios
from earlier and later periods. See id. § I.B.1.
237. See id. § I.B.2.a. ("We agree with the General Accounting Office that the fund
industry and the Commission should encourage fund shareholders to pay greater attention
to fees and expenses.").
238. See id. § IV.A.1.; see also GAO FEE STUDY REPLY, supra note 156, at 5
(considering the SEC's recommendations, but concluding that investors' interests would
be best served by disclosure of the fees paid on their shares).
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dollars incurred by a shareholder who invested a standardized
amount, such as $10,000.239 This table would be contained in the
investor's annual and semi-annual reports, but not in the investor's
one-page quarterly statements. 40  The SEC argued that a
standardized table, expressing fees using the common denominator of
a percentage of fund assets, would be sufficient to allow investors
easily to compare fees among different mutual funds.
2 4
'
At the request of members of Congress, the GAO reviewed and
commented on the SEC Report. 42  The GAO had two main
comments. First, the GAO found that the SEC's survey of mutual
fund fees charged by the 100 largest mutual funds provided additional
support for its conclusion that monopolistic competition existed in the
industry. 43 Second, the GAO objected to the SEC's proposed table
disclosure method for two reasons. The proposed system would not
disclose mutual fund fees in a manner that was specific and personal
to each investor, and it would not be contained in the most
meaningful and relevant source relied upon by investors-the
quarterly statement showing the dollar amount in the investor's
mutual fund account.244 The GAO also noted that the SEC's
proposed fee table also could be incorporated into quarterly
statements, and thereby allow investors to make comparisons across
mutual funds.2 4
5
It is against the backdrop of this very public debate that the
Commission made its recommendations concerning the disclosure of
fees charged by mutual fund companies who manage funds used as
239. See SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51, § IV.A.1.
240. See id. The SEC's rationale for including the table in the fund's annual and semi-
annual reports, rather than in the quarterly statement, was that investors should evaluate
the fee in light of the management analysis of the fund's performance, an analysis that is
contained in the annual and semi-annual reports. See id.
241. See id.
242. GAO FEE STUDY REPLY, supra note 156, at 1.
243. See id. at 3-4. The GAO found that the assets held by many large funds were
beyond the "breakpoints" in the fee structure that called for automatic reductions in the
percentage amount of the fee charged as the funds' assets grew, thereby passing on to the
funds' investors the cost savings realized through economies of scale. See id. The GAO
stated:
This lack of breakpoints may result because the funds have already achieved
whatever economies of scale exist so that fees may remain stable as assets grow.
Alternatively, if economies of scale do exist, the lack of breakpoints could be a
symptom that competitive forces are not sufficient to force funds to pass on
savings to investors.
Id. at 4.
244. See id. at 5-7.
245. See id. at 7.
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investment options for personal Social Security accounts. Given that
under the Commission's proposals the Board will not directly
regulate the level of mutual fund fees and expenses,2 46 the issue of
effective disclosure becomes paramount. With respect to disclosure,
the Commission's recommendation of a single fee, expressed as a
percentage of fund assets, takes the SEC's side of this debate.247
Although the GAO's more rigorous approach to fee disclosure may
be cost prohibitive if required for the entire mutual fund industry,
there are compelling policy reasons to require a higher standard for
fee disclosure in the much more limited context of personal Social
Security accounts. Under the current fee disclosure system, many
mutual fund investors, including many 401(k) plan participants, do
not realize the long-term impact of mutual fund fees on investment
performance.24 s If experienced mutual fund investors are unable to
understand and evaluate the adverse financial impact of fees, it seems
foolhardy to expect that literally millions of workers (many of whom
are woefully ignorant in financial matters) who become first-time
investors under a personal account system would be able to do so.
The issue of fee disclosure should be addressed from the perspective
of the unique social policy purpose of the Social Security system-to
promote income security in old age-rather than evaluated in terms
of cost effectiveness for the mutual fund industry.249 The significant
reduction in the balance of a worker's personal account at retirement
that can result from even a small difference in fees, compounded over
a worker's lifetime, justifies a rigorous system of regulatory disclosure
that aspires to the ideal in terms of effective communication to
246. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. ("The Governing Board chooses
the threshold amount that is required for people to move their balances into Tier II so that
it would be feasible for such accounts to be charged low transaction costs without the need
for price caps.").
247. See id.
248. See Carey, supra note 209; Invesmart Press Release, supra note 209.
249. Indeed, the cost concerns that prompted the SEC to reject the GAO's disclosure
recommendations can be mitigated in the context of a personal account system. The
SEC's objection to personalized quarterly fee bills was based primarily on the costs of
modifying the preexisting structure for how all mutual funds are marketed and distributed.
See SEC FEE STUDY, supra note 51, § IV.A.1. This concern is not nearly so strong in the
context of personal Social Security accounts, the legal structure of which has yet to be
created by Congress. Initially, the Board will select the mutual fund investment managers
for the nine funds allowed as investment options for Tier I accounts using a competitive
process. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. A personalized fee bill reporting
system simply could be built into the requirements governing this competitive selection
process. Similarly, when the Board certifies Tier II private sector mutual funds, one of the
requirements for certification could be that the mutual fund will provide quarterly fee bill
statements as proposed by the GAO.
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workers. In short, the fee disclosure system for personal accounts
should not simply conform to market standards-it should create new
standards that become an example of "best practices" for the mutual
fund industry.
B. Truth #2: Investment Education Will Significantly Change
Investment Behavior and Thereby Improve Investment Returns
If personal Social Security accounts are implemented, it is
undisputed that many workers will need investment education.25
Indeed, one of the advantages of personal Social Security accounts
cited by the Commission is that such accounts will promote greater
investment knowledge and expertise among the United States
workforce and might even improve the rate of national savings.25'
The Commission proposes that at the Tier I level, where all workers
initially must begin, the Board will undertake the task of providing
investment education to these workers by providing information
about investing for retirement generally and specific information
concerning their Tier I investment options.2  The underlying
implication, Truth #2, is that after spending several years becoming
educated at the Tier I level, workers will significantly change their
investment behavior, make sound investment decisions, and thereby
improve the investment returns from their personal Social Security
accounts.
This section of the Article argues that Truth #2 is flawed in two
respects. First, recent research concerning the impact of providing
investment education to 401(k) plan participants indicates that
investment education of the type proposed by the Commission will be
250. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES STUDY, supra note 62, at 34-36 (describing the
general lack of understanding exhibited by many Americans and asserting that the more
freedom participants are given in managing their personal accounts, the more ongoing
education they will need); Laibson et al., supra note 62, at 91, 92 nn.3- 4 (using a
hyperbolic model to examine under-saving in the United States); Medill, Individual
Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 14-17 (reviewing studies of retirement investment
knowledge among the public); Hirschman, supra note 62, at 33-36 (discussing human
resource departments' roles in informing employees about 401(k)s); McCarthy &
McWhirter, supra note 62, at 25-31 (noting that despite efforts to educate employees, as
many as fifty-seven percent choose to take cash payments from their 401(k)s when
changing jobs, rather than rolling their balance into their new employer's plan); see also
K.C. Swanson, Nebraska Sees Red Over Its 401(k) Plan (May 7, 2002), at http://www.
thestreet.com/_tscs/funds/belowradar/10021041.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (reporting on the abandonment of Nebraska's retirement plan due to employee
lack of knowledge and interest).
251. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 34, 39.
252. See id. at 46.
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ineffectual in influencing the investment behavior of workers under a
personal account system. Second, the Commission's proposed
structure for personal accounts appears to preclude the very type of
information that could influence worker investment behavior,
namely, providing workers with investment advice. 3
The effect of providing investment education on the investment
decisions of participants in 401(k) plans has been the subject of
numerous studies. 4  Early studies consistently reported that
investment education had a significant positive effect on the
investment decisions of 401(k) plan participants. 5  A recent study by
the National Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER") 256 calls into
question the results of these early studies due to serious
253. Investment "education" is a term of art in the ERISA field and is often used as a
contrast with another related term of art, investment "advice." The distinction between
investment education and investment advice is a critical one in the ERISA field because
one who provides investment advice for a fee or other compensation is a fiduciary, subject
to ERISA's rules governing fiduciary conduct and liability. See Medill, Individual
Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 27-28. In theory, as interpreted by the
Department of Labor, the difference between these two legal concepts is that education
involves general information concerning investment theory and plan investment options,
whereas advice consists of specific investment recommendations tailored to the unique
circumstances of the individual participant. See id. at 28-29, 51-54. In practice, the
difference between education and advice oftentimes is unclear, particularly from the
perspective of the plan participants. See id. at 54-62.
Researchers have explored the impact of providing investment "education" to
401(k) plan participants on investment behavior. Recent research in this area has
concluded that providing investment education is not effective in influencing investment
behavior. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 254-71. This research is consistent
with earlier studies of investment behavior finding a strong bias in favor of maintaining the
investment status quo. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia In 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON., 1149,
1176-79 (2001) (401(k) plans); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision-Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 31-33 (1988) (403(b) plans
sponsored by TIAA-CREF). Researchers attribute this status quo bias in part to the high
indirect transaction cost of gathering and analyzing the information necessary to make a
complex investment decision relative to the short-term benefit of making an investment
change. See Madrian & Shea, supra, at 1177-79. Investment education plays into this
status quo bias effect because of the general nature of the investment information
provided to the plan participant. In contrast, the individualized and specific nature of
investment advice serves to eliminate the indirect transaction cost associated with making
an investment change, thereby eliminating a root cause of status quo bias. Another root
cause of the status quo bias effect identified by researchers is the lack of self-control by
plan participants. See Madrian & Shea, supra, at 1179-80. Investment advice also
potentially mitigates this problem of self-control because rather than relying on self-
discipline, the participant can merely follow the "orders" of the investment advisor.
254. See PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 28-29 (collecting and
describing prior studies).
255. See id.
256. Id.
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methodological flaws.257 The NBER researchers found that, contrary
to the findings of these earlier studies, investment education does not
significantly change investment behavior among 401(k) plan
participants." 8
The NBER researchers classified earlier studies of the effects of
investment education as falling into two categories.259 The first
category involved case studies of companies or organizations where
the employer provided financial education to its workers.260 The
NBER researchers found that the results of these case studies were
methodologically flawed because the reported findings were based on
the investment changes the participants said they intended to make,
rather than on the investment changes the participants actually
made.26 The NBER researchers concluded:
Unfortunately, a growing body of both theoretical and
empirical evidence, including the survey results reported in
... this paper, suggests that despite the best intentions of
employees, retirement saving is one area in which
individuals excel at delay. Thus, measures of intended
behavior are likely to dramatically overstate the actual effects
of financial education.262
The second category of investment education studies criticized by the
NBER researchers were described as "cross-sectional surveys of
individuals from across the population, not just from a single
company or organization." '263 The NBER researchers characterized
these cross-sectional data surveys as presenting "numerous"
problems, such as (1) the inability to control for other significant
factors, such as 401(k) plan design, (2) the lack of a uniform definition
of "financial education," (3) possible recall bias that would overstate
the impact of financial education, and (4) "quite low" response rates
by survey participants.264
To correct these methodological errors, the NBER researchers
compiled a new data set.265 One of the companies in the study,
257. See id. at 28-29.
258. See id. at 31.
259. See id. at 28-29.
260. See id. at 28.
261. See id. at 28-29.
262. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This "gap" between intention and
action is a well-recognized problem in economic studies of consumer behavior. See
Laibson et al., supra note 62, at 92-93; Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1177-80.
263. PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 29.
264. Id. at 29-30.
265. See id. at 44 tbl.1.
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Company C, was an insurance company with 30,000 workers.266
Company C hired a financial education provider to provide one-hour
seminars to its employees. The provider's seminar covered basic
topics such as how to set retirement savings goals to meet retirement
income targets and the fundamental principles of investing, such as
asset classes, investment risk, and investment diversification. 267 The
data set collected from Company C was unique in that it enabled the
researchers to track the pre-seminar and post-seminar investment
behavior of the seminar attendees.268 The NBER researchers found
that of those seminar attendees who were already participating in the
plan, 28% reported they planned to increase their 401(k) contribution
rate, 41% reported they planned to change their investment choices,
and 36% reported they would change their percentage allocations
among the various plan investment choices.269 In reality, however,
only 8% of the 401(k) plan participants attending the seminars
increased their contribution rate, 15% changed their investment
choices, and 10% changed their allocation percentages.27 ° The NBER
researchers concluded: "[w]hile the fraction of seminar attendees
making such changes is slightly higher than the fraction of non-
seminar attendees, it is substantially below what the attendees reported
they planned on doing. "271
The NBER study could be criticized on the ground that
Company C's financial education seminars provided information that
was too general to be useful to the participants. In other words, the
seminars provided general investment education, when what 401(k)
participants really needed was individualized investment advice.272
Proponents of Truth #2 are likely to minimize the policy implications
of the NBER study by arguing that, in contrast to the Company C
employees, workers who invest in personal Social Security accounts
will receive more than just general investment education; they will
receive "informative" (investment) advice.273
266. Id. at 30, 44 tbl.1.
267. See id. at 30.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 31.
270. Id.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. For a detailed discussion of the fine legal distinctions between general investment
education and individualized investment advice under the federal laws governing 401(k)
plans, see generally Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 27-48.
273. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
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In the 401(k) plan context, the line between investment
education and investment advice has been a murky one.274 Employers
and plan service providers generally have faced two significant legal
obstacles to providing 401(k) plan participants with personalized
investment advice. The first legal obstacle to providing 401(k)
participants with investment advice is the potential co-fiduciary
liability of the employer for "bad" advice 275 under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act 276 ("ERISA"), the federal law that
governs the duties of employers who sponsor 401(k) plans and the
service providers who assist employers in administering their plans.277
This obstacle presumably would not exist in the context of personal
Social Security accounts, where the governmental Board would
effectively substitute for the employer. The other legal obstacle to
providing workers with investment advice has been the prohibited
transaction rules of ERISA. 278  To avoid violating ERISA's
274. See supra note 253.
275. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 48. A recent survey
of employers by the Profit Sharing Council of America found that the overwhelming
reason why employers did not provide investment advice to their workers was the
potential legal liability. See Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Investment Advice
Survey 2001, at http://www.psca.org/data/advice2001printer.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
276. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.) ("ERISA").
277. This potential employer liability arises under ERISA's fiduciary and co-fiduciary
duty provisions. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (Supp. 2002); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1999);
Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 30-32, 48.
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106; Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at
38-48. ERISA's prohibited transaction rules generally bar a plan fiduciary from self-
dealing with plan assets, engaging in a transaction using plan assets where the fiduciary has
a conflict of interest, or receiving kickbacks from other persons who are engaged in a
transaction involving plan assets. See § 1106(b)(1)-(3). ERISA defines a plan fiduciary to
include any person who renders investment advice for compensation with respect to any
moneys or property of the plan (whether the compensation is direct or indirect). Id.
§ 1002(21)(A)(ii); see also Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 28-30
(discussing the Department of Labor's regulatory interpretations of the definition of an
investment advisor). Generally, service providers receive at least a portion of the mutual
fund fees that are deducted from the plan's assets, i.e., the plan's mutual fund investment
options, The service provider's receipt of mutual fund fees satisfies the "compensation"
element required for fiduciary status under the statutory definition of an investment
advisor. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 30, 41-46
(explaining mutual fund fee arrangements with service providers in the 401(k) plan
context). Consequently, if the service provider also renders investment advice, it then
becomes a fiduciary under ERISA, and as a consequence of the prohibited transaction
rules, the service provider is prohibited from retaining its share of mutual fund fees. See
id. at 30. Faced with the choice of retaining their portion of mutual fund fees or providing
investment advice, service providers have chosen to keep the mutual fund fees and not
render investment advice. See id.
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prohibited transaction rules, service providers have, used independent
investment experts to develop computer models programmed to
generate model asset allocation portfolios based upon the
participant's individualized investment goals and risk tolerance
characteristics. 7 9 When the computerized investment advice model
was first developed, the industry practice was for the service provider
to submit its program to the Department of Labor and obtain an
administrative exemption from the prohibited transaction rules28
prior to using the model to offer investment advice to its "customers,"
the 401(k) participants. In December of 2001, however, the
Department of Labor issued an advisory opinion ("SunAmerica
letter") 28 1 concerning a computerized investment advice program that
effectively relieves service providers from going through the
cumbersome and costly administrative exemption procedure.282 The
anticipated result of the SunAmerica letterwill be the proliferation of
computerized investment advice models as a means of providing
personalized investment advice to 401(k) participants.283
The computerized investment advice models developed by the
financial services industry for 401(k) plan participants represent a
cost-effective mechanism for delivering "personalized" investment
advice to the millions of workers who would invest in personal Social
Security accounts. At the Tier I level, the Board's program of
"informative" advice could be developed to incorporate such
computer models. At the Tier II level, however, it is unclear whether
the Commission's emphasis on broad market diversification as a
279. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 57-62 (commenting
on the mechanics of such computer models).
280. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(a) (Supp. 2002); Medill, Individual Responsibility Model,
supra note 16, at 57-62, 77-78.
281. Advisory Opinion Letter 2001-09A from Louis Campagna, Chief, Division of
Fiduciary Interpretations, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., to William A. Schmidt &
Eric Berger, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, L.L.P., Counsel for SunAmerica, (Dec. 14, 2001), at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory200l/200l-09A.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
282. See Press Release, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., Statement of Assistant
Secretary Ann L. Combs Regarding SunAmerica Advisory Opinion (Dec. 19, 2001), at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/media/press/pr121911.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Employee Benefits Inst. of Am., DOL Permits Investment Company to Hire
Financial Advisors for Participants (Dec. 27, 2001), at http://www.ebia.com/weekly/articles/
2001/401k011227DOL2001-09A.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Groom Law Group, DOL Advisory Opinion Clarifies Application of Prohibited
Transaction Rules to Asset Allocation Programs (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.groom.com/
articlesdisplay.asp?display=157 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
283. See Press Release, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., supra note 282; Employee
Benefits Inst. of Am., supra note 282; Groom Law Group, supra note 282.
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prerequisite to certification of private sector mutual funds as Tier II
investments284 would accommodate these computerized investment
advice models.
The Commission's proposed diversification standard for Board
certification of Tier II private sector mutual funds is reminiscent of
the historical "prudent person" standard imposed on trustees of a
trust when selecting trust investments.285 Under the prudent person
standard, the trustee had to evaluate the prudence of each investment
held by the trust individually.286 Similarly, the Commission proposes
that the Board may only certify Tier II private sector mutual funds if
they "meet very strict diversification requirements as established by
the Governing Board .... Stock funds must be very diversified and
reflect the performance of many companies spanning all major
commercial sectors. 287
Today's approach to the trustee's duty of care in selecting trust
investments, known as the "prudent investor" standard, relies instead
upon the modern portfolio theory of investments.288 Under the
prudent investor standard, each individual trust investment, in and of
itself, does not have to satisfy the historical prudent person standard
of diversification. 289 Rather, under the prudent investor standard the
diversification and risk of the investments held by the trust are
evaluated as a whole in accordance with modern portfolio theory.29°
The more recent computerized investment advice programs
developed in the context of 401(k) plans are programmed by
independent investment experts using modern portfolio theory.291 To
function properly, a computer model programmed using modern
portfolio theory could not use investment options (Tier II private
sector mutual funds) that individually and independently are broadly
diversified. Rather, the program is designed to use a set of
investment options that independently are not diversified, but which
result in an overall investment portfolio that is diversified, and which
is designed to produce an overall higher rate of total return.
Admittedly, there have been no studies of whether computerized
284. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
285. Compare id., with AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 612, at 16 (3d rev. ed. 2000) ("The prudent person standard required a trustee
to determine the prudence of each investment individually.").
286. HESS ET AL., supra note 285, § 612, at 16.
287. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
288. See HESS ET AL., supra note 285, § 611, at 6.
289. See id. § 612, at 31-32.
290. See id. § 612, at 27, 31-32.
291. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 59-60.
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investment advice models are effective in changing the investment
behavior of 401(k) participants. Clearly, however, workers could
benefit from something more constructive than "informative" advice
when selecting investments for their personal Social Security
accounts. Unfortunately, the Commission's proposed administrative
structure appears to prevent the possible use of something more
constructive-computerized investment advice programs-in the
context of personal accounts.
C. Truth #3: Personal Accounts Will "Build Wealth" Among Low-
Income and Minority Workers
The Commission (and others) assert that the traditional Social
Security system is unfair to low-income or minority workers who die
prior to ever receiving benefits, or who have a shorter life expectancy
as a group and therefore do not receive their "money's worth" in
traditional benefit payments.292 Under the Commission's proposed
structure for personal Social Security accounts, if a worker dies prior
to becoming eligible for traditional benefits, the worker's account
balance will become part of her estate.293 Similarly, if a retired
worker does not consume the balance of her Social Security account
during life, any remaining account balance may be bequeathed at
death.294
For low-income or minority workers who die prior to retirement,
personal Social Security accounts would provide an opportunity for
intergenerational wealth transfer that is not available under the
traditional benefit system.295 Critics of personal Social Security
accounts have responded to this point by arguing that low-income and
minority workers benefit disproportionately from the disability
benefits and benefits paid to their minor children under the current
traditional Social Security system and from the progressive structure
of traditional Social Security benefits.296 Reductions in these benefits
292. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; MICHAEL TANNER, DISPARATE
IMPACT: SOCIAL SECURITY AND AFRICAN AMERICANS 2 (CATO Inst. Briefing Papers
No. 61, Feb. 5, 2001), at http://www.socialsecurity.org/pubs/articles/bp61.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
293. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. The Commission Report explicitly
addresses only bequests (the technical term for a gift made by a will). Presumably this is
an oversight, and any remaining balance of a worker who died intestate would pass to the
deceased worker's heirs under the applicable state laws of intestate succession if the
worker dies without a will. See id. at 55.
294. See id. at 56.
295. See id. at 32.
296. One report critical of the Commission's plan noted that:
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under the Commission's proposals,297 critics argue, will more than
offset the benefits of intergenerational wealth transfers for low-
income and minority workers as a group.298
To date, the public debate concerning the "wealth building"
potential of personal accounts has focused on workers who die prior
to retirement, and has overlooked the implications for low-income
workers of how benefits from personal Social Security accounts will
be paid to workers who survive to retirement. The Commission's
proposal structure for benefit payments undermines Truth #3 in two
respects. First, under the Commission's proposed structure for
controlling distributions from personal accounts, a low-income
worker who survives to retirement must annuitize most (if not all) of
the balance in her personal account.299  Second, the Commission's
distribution structure creates an adverse selection problem, which will
increase the costs of annuitization. 0 The discussion below illustrates
[Mjinorities have higher rates of disability, on average, than the rest of the
population and thus disproportionately benefit from the disability benefits that
Social Security provides. Social Security data show, for example, that the
percentage of black workers aged 50-59 who became disabled in 1997 was nearly
double the percentage of all workers in that age group who became disabled.
Blacks account for 13 percent of working-age Americans, but 17 percent of
disabled workers' beneficiaries.... The reductions in survivor benefits also
would disproportionately harm minorities: African-American children currently
constitute 15 percent of Americans under age 18 but more than 22 percent of the
children who receive Social Security survivor benefits.
DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 140, at 19-20; see also BERNARD WASOW, SETTING
THE RECORD STRAIGHT: Two FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT AFRICAN AMERICANS AND
SOCIAL SECURITY 1-3 (The Century Foundation, Mar. 2002), at http://www.socsec.org/
facts/RecordStraight/AfricanAmericans.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (asserting that African-Americans are not short-changed by the current Social
Security system).
297. These reductions are the result of the Commission's proposal to change the index
method for all types of traditional Social Security benefits, including disability and young
survivors benefits, from the wage index to the price (inflation) index. See DIAMOND &
ORSZAG, supra note 140, at 13-20. Measuring the effect of this indexing change against
the benchmark of benefits scheduled to be paid under the current Social Security benefit
formula, Diamond and Orszag conclude that under Model 2, "[t]hese benefit reductions
are so substantial that they are sufficient, by themselves, to more than eliminate the long-
term deficit in Social Security." Id. at 17. Under Model 3, this indexing change by itself
would eliminate two-thirds of Social Security's projected long-term deficit. Id. Diamond
and Orszag also conclude that, although Model 2 provides modest increases in the
minimum traditional benefit paid to workers with low wages throughout a long career and
for persons with below-average Social Security benefits, eventually the overall benefit
reductions caused by the indexing change will outweigh Model 2's increase in the
traditional minimum benefit for this sub-group of beneficiaries. See id.
298. See id. at 19-20; Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social
Security: Eight Myths, 74 TAx NOTES 1167, 1173 (1997).
299. See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 311-22 and accompanying text.
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why the costs of adverse selection are likely to fall' most heavily, and
unfairly, on low-income workers.310
In support of Truth #3, the co-chairmen of the Commission
provide the following example of the potential that personal accounts
hold for "wealth building":
To illustrate what a participant might anticipate from setting
aside one percent of his or her pay, matched with the
government's one percent, we can forecast the situation of a
"scaled medium earner" [one who earns $35,277 in annual
income in today's dollars302] entering the workforce at age 21
and retiring at age 65 in the year 2052. Assume a portfolio
choice-there should be choices-roughly that of the
current Thrift Savings Plan: 50 percent corporate equity, 30
percent corporate bonds, and 20 percent U.S. Treasury
bonds. Real yields are assumed to be 6.5 percent for
equities, 3.5 percent for corporate bonds, and 3 percent for
Treasury bonds.30 3 Also assume that this worker pays 0.3
percent of his account assets for annual administrative costs.
At retirement she or he will have an expected portfolio
worth $523,000 ($101,000 in constant 2001 dollars). A two-
earner family could easily have an expected net "cash"
worth of $1 million.304
This example ignores, of course, the Commission's own proposal for
the form of distributions from personal accounts. Under the
Commission's proposed requirements, a worker's combined total
annual income from her traditional Social Security benefits and the
benefits attributable to the worker's personal account must be
sufficient to maintain the worker (and if married, the worker's
301. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
302. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 n.4.
303. These are the same assumptions concerning average annual real rates of
investment return that produce the Commission's overall assumed rate of 4.6%. See id. at
97.
304. Id. at 9. This paragraph, found in the introduction to the Commission's Report, is
misleading because the $523,000 figure cited by the Commission has not been adjusted
(reduced) for inflation, despite the fact that this figure purports to be derived from "real
yields." Using the assumptions made by the Commission in this paragraph, it is possible to
"reverse engineer" how the Commission arrived at its 2001 constant dollars figure of
$101,000. This reverse engineering process is most easily explained as a math story
problem. If a worker contributes two percent of $35,277 at the end of each year annually
for a period of forty-five years, and the worker's account contributions earn an annual
compounded real rate of return of 4.6, how much money will be in the worker's account at
the end of the period? The answer is $100,724.10, or approximately $101,000, the figure in
2001 constant dollars cited by the Commission. A copy of the computer program
incorporating the mathematical translation of the above-described math story problem is
available from the author upon request.
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spouse) "safely above the poverty line" during retirement. 0
Therefore, the single worker who survives to retirement in the
example above will not be able to access the "wealth" built up in her
account. She must annuitize at least a portion of it to satisfy the
minimum standard.
Truth #3, the wealth building argument in favor of personal
accounts, is designed to appeal primarily to low-income workers.
Therefore, to evaluate the validity of this assertion, it is important to
ask how much of a low-income worker's account must be annuitized
to satisfy the suggested minimum income standard. Because the
Commission provides the value of the single worker's account in the
example above in constant 2001 dollars (i.e., adjusted for the effect of
inflation), it is possible to answer this hypothetical question.
In the Commission's illustrations of the total benefits that would
be provided by the combination of traditional Social Security benefits
and personal accounts, the Commission estimates that a low-income
worker retiring in 2052 would receive $8,568 annually in traditional
Social Security benefits (again, this estimate is in constant 2001
dollars).3 6 Applying the Commission's recommended minimum
"safely above the poverty line" standard for total benefits, assume
that total benefits of $18,000 annually (again, in constant 2001 dollars)
are required.3 7 Using Internal Revenue Service tables,30 8 it is possible
to compute the economic value as of December 2001 of an annuity
for a worker, age sixty-five, that will pay $1,500 per month for life.
305. Id. at 56.
306. Id. at 111 (Model 1), 122 (Model 2), 133 (Model 3). This amount is the
Commission's estimate of the benefit affordable under current law, given that the
traditional Social Security system is projected to be 27.6% under-funded in 2052. Id. at
111, 122, 133. The projected benefit in 2001 dollars for a low-income worker retiring in
2052, not taking into account funding deficits, is $11,832. Id.
307. The Commission does not define a dollar amount for its suggested minimum
income standard. I selected $18,000 as an example because it provides for a monthly
income of $1,500, which seemed adequate, but certainly not extravagant. For 2001, the
federal poverty level for a single individual residing in the forty-eight contiguous United
States or the District of Columbia was $8,590. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv.,
The 2001 HHS Poverty Guidelines, at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/Olpoverty.htm
(last modified Mar. 4, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
308. The above calculation uses Table S, promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service
under section 7520 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 7520 (West 2002). Table S is a
gender-neutral table used to calculate the economic value of a single-life annuity. Table S
is generally regarded by estate planners as containing mortality assumptions that are
conservative in comparison with the mortality assumptions used by the vendors of
individual annuities. By 2052, the Internal Revenue Service (or private annuity vendors)
could adjust mortality assumptions upward to reflect longer life expectancies. The effect
of such an adjustment would be to require a larger lump sum payment up front to generate
the same amount of monthly income payments to the annuitant for life.
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The economic value of this annuity is $109,642,309 or more than the
Commission's hypothetical medium-income worker holds in her
personal account.
What does this $109,642 figure mean for low-income workers? It
means that low-income workers who live to retirement will not be
able to access the "wealth" built up in their personal accounts. They
will be forced to annuitize all of their account balance to satisfy the
Commission's minimum income standard.310
The second flaw in Truth #3 concerns the adverse selection
problem31' created by the Commission's proposed benefit payment
options for personal Social Security accounts. Recall that the
Commission proposes that at retirement a worker will have two
options for satisfying the minimum retirement income requirement.
The worker may use the account balance to purchase a single
premium immediate annuity that will generate the requisite amount
of income ("traditional annuity"). 312  Alternatively, the worker may
choose to leave a Board-determined amount in the account and make
309. This calculation uses the December 2001 applicable federal rate of 4.8% and
makes an adjustment for the monthly payment feature. A copy of the printout from the
Tiger Table computer software used to run the calculation is on file with the author.
310. Note that the above comparison, using the Commission's example of the account
balance of a medium-income worker, overestimates the balance in a low-income worker's
account. The low-income worker will have even less in her account at retirement because
account contributions are based on a percentage of the worker's income under all three of
the Commission reform models. In addition, note too that the economic value of the
monthly annuity, $109,642, underestimates the amount it would cost a low-income worker
to purchase such an annuity because it does not include a profit margin for the insurance
company or other vendor who provides the annuity. Although proponents of personal
accounts may argue that the cost of a variable annuity (recall that the Commission
assumes a variable annuity earning an average annual real rate of return of 4.6%, or that
the account will continue to earn 4.6% during the worker's retirement years) would be
less, I view this argument as unresponsive to my fundamental point-Truth #3 is
disingenuous for low-income workers who survive to retirement.
311. The problem of adverse selection occurs when a large group of potential insureds
are treated alike irrespective of some factor that differentiates them as insurance risks. In
these circumstances, a disproportionately high percentage of applications for such
insurance tends to come from the less desirable applicants because they receive the better
bargain. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 8 (1971). Adverse
selection occurs in the private market for single premium immediate annuities because
insurers assume that persons who voluntarily purchase such annuities tend to live longer
than average. The price for the annuity is set at a higher level to compensate the insurer
for the longer life expectancy of the purchaser. See Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence
on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities, in THE ROLE OF ANNUITY MARKETS IN
FINANCING RETIREMENT 71, 71-72 (Jeffrey R. Brown et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
ANNUITY MARKETS].
312. The Commission Report describes the Board as being "required to make available
different types of annuities," presumably by outsourcing to outside annuity providers, e.g.,
insurance companies. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
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withdrawals as needed. This second option effectively allows the
worker to "self-annuitize" her account, thereby avoiding the costs
associated with the risk of longevity that are charged by the provider
of a traditional annuity ("self-annuity option").313
This distribution structure is functionally analogous to the
distribution options for 401(k) plan accounts.314 In theory, a 401(k)
plan participant may take a lump sum distribution and use the money
to purchase a traditional annuity from an insurance company or other
vendor. Alternatively, the worker may leave the money invested in
the 401(k) plan account, withdrawing amounts as needed. Despite
the apparent usefulness of traditional annuities for converting lump
sum retirement benefits into a guaranteed stream of retirement
income, the market for traditional annuities in the United States is
quite small.315 The traditional explanation given by economists for
the low demand for traditional annuities is the problem of adverse
selection.316 Professor Kathryn L. Moore has argued that 401(k)
participants rarely purchase annuities because annuities purchased on
the private market provide a less than actuarial fair rate of return.317
To account for adverse selection and other transaction costs,318 the
price charged for an annuity purchased by an individual 401(k) plan
participant on the private market exceeds its expected economic
value in projected lifetime payments.319 Consequently, most 401(k)
313. See id. at 56 (describing the "gradual withdrawal" alternative to a purchased
annuity). For recent research analyzing the risk of longevity under a self-annuitization
strategy, see generally PETER ALBRECHT & RAIMOND MAUER, SELF-ANNUITIZATION
CONSUMPTION SHORTFALL IN RETIREMENT AND ASSET ALLOCATION: THE ANNUITY
BENCHMARK, (Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2002-6, 2002), at http://prc.
wharton.upenn.edu/prc/PRC/WP/WP2002-6.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); John Ameriks et al., Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, J. FIN. PLAN.,
Dec. 2001, at 60.
314. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
315. See Introduction and Overview, in ANNUITY MARKETS, supra note 311, at 7-8.
316. See id. at 8-9; A.M. Milevsky, Optional Asset Allocation Towards the End of the
Life Cycle: To Annuitize or Not to Annuitize?, 65 J. RISK & INS. 401, 402 (1998); Mitchell
et. al., supra note 311, at 71.
317. See Moore, Partial Privatization, supra note 8, at 378-81 & n.179.
318. These other transaction costs include such items as marketing and a profit margin
for the issuer of the annuity. See Mitchell et al., supra note 311, at 72.
319. Economists recently have begun to study the effects of adverse selection on the
price of single premium immediate annuities in the United States annuity market.
Professor Jeffrey R. Brown estimated the cost of adverse selection in annuity pricing at
ten percent of the purchase price. See JEFFREY R. BROWN, How SHOULD WE INSURE
AGAINST LONGEVITY RISK IN PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY? 10 (Ctr. for Ret.
Research, Issue Brief No. 4, Aug. 2000), at http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/ib_4.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Professors Mitchell and McCarthy
estimated that adverse selection and transaction costs were slightly less than ten percent of
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participants apparently choose to self-annuitize their retirement
savings and assume the risk of longevity themselves.32 °
A similar adverse selection problem exists in the Commission's
proposed distribution structure for personal Social Security accounts.
Workers who know (or suspect, based on their personal health
history) that they are unlikely to meet or exceed their actuarial life
expectancies will tend to choose the self-annuity option. Workers
who know (or suspect, again based on their personal health history)
that they will outlive their actuarial life expectancy will tend to
choose the traditional annuity option and shift the risk of longevity to
the provider of the annuity. Annuity providers will price the
traditional annuity at a higher cost to account for this systemic
increased risk of longevity among purchasers of traditional annuities.
Analyzed in terms of income classes, and controlling for health
status, it seems apparent which group of workers will be the most
likely to select the traditional annuity option, and which group of
workers will be the most likely to select the self-annuity option.
Higher income workers are more likely to have accumulated other
personal and retirement savings during their lifetime. In addition,
higher income workers are more likely to view their personal
accounts as a mechanism for intergenerational wealth transfer and
consequently are likely to favor the self-annuity option for this
reason.
321
Low-income workers are much less likely to have accumulated a
significant amount of other personal and retirement savings during
their lifetimes to draw upon during their retirement years. Thus, low-
income workers are less well-positioned to assume the risks of
longevity themselves and self-annuitize their personal accounts to
the purchase price of the annuity See OLIVIA S. MITCHELL & DAVID MCCARTHY,
ANNUITIES FOR AN AGEING WORLD 14 (Pension Research Council Working Paper No.
2002-12, June 2002), at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-prc/PRCWPWP2002-12.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Although adverse selection and transaction
costs for traditional annuities have declined since 1985, economists are uncertain as to why
this decline occurred. See Mitchell et al., supra note 311, at 91-92; James M. Poterba &
Mark J. Warshawsky, The Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual
Accounts, in ANNUITY MARKETS, supra note 311, at 153, 182-83.
320. See Moore, Partial Privatization, supra note 8, at 378-80 n.179. Other possible
reasons why individuals choose not to purchase a traditional annuity with their 401(k) plan
savings include a desire to preserve liquidity in case of an unanticipated financial
emergency, the advice of financial planning experts to avoid annuitizing, underestimating
one's own risk of longevity, or a desire to pass on accumulated wealth to future
generations. See BROWN, supra note 319, at 10-13; MITCHELL & MCCARTHY, supra note
319, at 16-18.
321. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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satisfy the Board's minimum income retirement standard.
Controlling for health status factors, this means that low-income
workers will be more likely to select the traditional annuity option
than higher income workers. The adverse selection problem created
by giving workers the option of satisfying the Board's minimum
retirement income requirement by choosing between a traditional
annuity and a self-annuity will raise the cost of the annuity for
everyone who selects the traditional annuity. But unfortunately, the
group of workers upon whom the costs of adverse selection is likely to
fall most heavily will be low-income workers-the very workers who
are supposed to be "building wealth" through personal Social
Security accounts.322
This result can be easily avoided. In defined benefit plans
sponsored by private employers, the problem of adverse selection is
resolved by requiring that the normal form of distribution for plan
benefits must be in the form of a traditional annuity, payable for the
life of the participant, or, if the participant is married, the joint lives
of the participant and spouse.323 A system requiring all workers who
survive to retirement to purchase a traditional annuity to satisfy the
Board's minimum income requirement would eliminate this adverse
322. Proponents of personal accounts may respond to this argument by noting that the
Board can mitigate the potential for adverse selection by making available annuities with a
sum-certain payment provision, thereby encouraging more workers to select the
traditional annuity option. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. The economic
trade-off for a sum-certain annuity, however, will be either lower guaranteed lifetime
monthly payments, or a higher cost annuity, both detriments to lower-income workers.
Proponents of personal accounts also could argue that the Board could reduce the costs of
adverse selection by requiring annuity providers to build lower life expectancy
assumptions into the price of annuities for low-income and minority workers. There are
several potential problems with this approach. First, annuity vendors may be unwilling to
provide annuities on these terms. Second, disparate treatment of minority workers in
annuity pricing is likely to prove politically controversial. Third, such an approach is
philosophically inconsistent with the gender-neutral standards required under federal law
for traditional annuities offered by defined benefit plans. See discussion infra note 323.
323. This requirement is known as the "qualified joint and survivor annuity
requirement." See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417 (West 2002). To protect spouses of workers
who die prior to retirement, the normal form of distribution of benefits from a defined
benefit plan to the deceased worker's spouse also is in the form of a traditional annuity.
This is known as the "qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity requirement." See id.
Federal law also requires unisex pricing of traditional annuities purchased by defined
benefit plans so that the monthly benefits for a male and a female worker with the same
work and compensation history are equal, despite the fact that women in general enjoy
longer life expectancies. See SHEILA CAMPBELL & ALICIA H. MUNNELL, SEX AND
401(K) PLANS 1-2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research, May 2002), at http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/
facts/jtf_4.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). State laws regulating the
sale of annuities to individuals do not require unisex pricing. Id. at 2. The Commission
Report does not address this potential issue of gender equity.
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selection problem and increase the payouts from traditional
annuities.324
In summary, a close examination of the potential "wealth
building" effect of personal Social Security accounts is much more
limited than proponents of Truth #3 would have the general public,
and low-income workers in particular, believe. This wealth building
effect will be limited to those workers who die prior to becoming
eligible for Social Security benefits, or those who know they are likely
to die prior to their actuarial life expectancy, and therefore select the
self-annuity option.3 25  The increased potential benefits of
intergenerational wealth transfer for this sub-group are offset,
however, by the reductions in disability and young survivor benefits
under the Commission's proposals which disproportionately benefit
minority and low-income workers.3 26  For low-income workers who
survive to their retirement years, Truth #3 is simply a canard. Low-
income retirees will need to annuitize most, if not all, of their
personal accounts to satisfy the Board's minimum retirement income
requirement. Low-income retirees are more likely to choose the
traditional annuity option because they form the income category
that is least well positioned, in terms of other financial resources, to
bear the risks of longevity. It is this group of low-income retirees who
will bear the brunt of the costs of adverse selection, potentially
resulting in a lower level of benefits from their personal accounts.327
324. Professor Brown suggests that if adverse selection is eliminated by a mandatory
annuity requirement, annuity payouts might increase by as much as ten percent. See
BROWN, supra note 319, at 10. A mandatory annuity requirement also would eliminate
the possibility, for all workers, that personal accounts could serve the dual function of
promoting intergenerational wealth transfer. This secondary benefit, however, primarily
would be lost by higher-income workers who do not need to consume their account
balance to provide for income during retirement.
325. Even for this limited group, the wealth created and transferred at death will be
limited to the balance of the personal account, a limited amount for low-income workers.
326. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
327. Two countervailing costs associated with requiring workers to purchase traditional
annuities are: (1) the possibility of over-annuitization by some individuals; and (2) the
potential redistribution effects due to different group characteristics of mortality risk. See
BROWN, supra note 319, at 16. The risk of over-annuitization is minimized because
workers are required to annuitize only that portion of their personal Social Security
account necessary to satisfy the Board's minimum retirement income standard. See supra
notes 54-56 and accompanying text. The potential redistribution effects of a mandatory
traditional annuity requirement are a more serious concern because redistribution would
offset the benefits of eliminating adverse selection for low-income and minority workers.
The author is unaware of any study that measures how the potential redistribution effects
of a traditional annuity requirement for personal accounts compare to the costs of adverse
selection.
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D. Truth #4: Giving Workers Investment Control Will Avoid Large
Concentrations of Money (and Related Power) in the Hands of a
Few Government Bureaucrats and Money Managers
1. Political Influence and the Personal Social Security Account
System
Considering the high political priority given to Social Security,
the risk that elected officials and partisan politics may influence the
Commission's proposed regulatory structure should be considered.
There are at least two areas of potential concern. First, there is the
risk of political influence tainting the decisions of the Board as it
oversees the operation and administration of the personal account
system. Second, there is the risk that Congress will yield to the
demands of constituents who desire greater access to and control over
the funds in their personal accounts.
The Commission expressly recognizes the first risk, finding that
"[t]o isolate the Governing Board from political risk, Congress should
follow the models of the Thrift Savings Plan and the Federal Reserve
Board when designing the Board structure.""3 8  The Commission
Report suggests that by giving the Board a funding source for its
budget that is independent of both Congress and the President, and
by giving Board members lengthy and staggered terms, the risk of
political influence will be minimized.3"9
Administrative law scholars and political scientists have long
studied how politics influences the conduct of administrative
agencies, including "independent" regulatory agencies.33 Although a
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, two
observations concerning the unique context of personal Social
Security accounts are appropriate. First, the Commission's
comparison with the structure and funding of the Thrift Savings Plan
and Federal Reserve Board seems oddly oblivious to the political
intensity that surrounds any proposed change to the traditional Social
328. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
329. See id.
330. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESSES BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 164-87 (1955); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 61-63, 86-97 (1989); PETER WOLL,
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 6-18 (2d ed. 1977). For a classic case study of the
relationship between one independent regulatory agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the White House, see generally WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967).
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Security system.133 The debate over Social Security reform, and
personal accounts in particular, has been a defining and divisive issue
for Republican and Democratic candidates in the 2000 and 2002
national election cycles.332 To assert that, once a personal account
system is enacted, the governing Board will be relegated to the public
anonymity and private autonomy of the directors of the Thrift
Savings Plan and the Federal Reserve Board (Alan Greenspan being
one notable exception) simply strains credibility.333
Second, the Commission itself acknowledges the risk that the
Board will be subject to political pressure to favor investment policies
that further social policy goals rather than maximize investment
returns ("social investing"). 34  This risk cannot be underestimated,
due to the sheer magnitude of the dollars at stake. A recent study of
the Commission's proposals estimates that if, for example, Model 2 is
enacted, approximately $2 trillion dollars will be transferred to the
personal account system, and the Board's control, over the next
seventy-five years.3
35
Social investing has been most prevalent in public sector pension
plans.336 The Commission concludes that, because personal accounts
are structured differently from these public sector pension plans, the
risk that Board members will be politically pressured to favor an
investment strategy (and investment managers) amenable to social
investing is "significantly reduced. ' 337  Rather than address the
331. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 70, at 306 ("[Ojur own observations of
national politics suggest that most proposed changes are immediately characterized by
certain policy and political communities as either impossible or inevitable. The middle
ground between these polar positions is seldom glimpsed.").
332. See Erin P. Billings, GOP Drops Social Security Legislation for the Year, Fearing
It's Too Divisive, ROLL CALL DAILY, Apr. 15, 2002; David Espo, GOP Book Advises
House Candidates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 25137362; Don Lambro,
Social Security Changes to be Theme of Fall Race, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at Al,
2002 WL 2909491; Jim VandeHei & Juliet Eilperin, Bush's Plan for Social Security Loses
Favor, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2002, at Al.
333. Perhaps a more realistic assessment of the Board's potential political risk is
evidenced by the controversy surrounding the appointment of the Commission members
themselves. From the beginning, the Commission has been dogged by charges that its
findings and conclusions were politically predetermined. See Nicholas Confessore,
Commission Impossible: Why Bush is Abandoning Social Security Reform, AM.
PROSPECT, Dec. 17, 2001, at 10, 2001 WL 7681336.
334. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-61.
335. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 140, at 3. This estimate is in present dollars.
336. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-61.
337. Id. at 61. Political pressure to promote social investing is not the only way that
politics and politicians may influence the Board's investment policies. For example, if the
default investment fund experiences a loss in actual dollars for several years due to
conditions in the equity markets, disgruntled workers may demand that the federal
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Board's position in detail here, I take up this social investing risk later
in this Part of the Article, where I discuss the potentially powerful
role of the Board and its selected money managers in overseeing the
default investment fund for personal accounts.338
A different type of political risk-that Congress may yield to the
demands of constituents and reject some of the Commission's more
paternalistic features for personal accounts-cannot be addressed by
regulatory structure. Several of the Commission's proposed features
are likely to prove unpopular, such as the prohibition on pre-
retirement withdrawals,339 mandatory annuitization,34 ° and limiting
changes in investment options to once per year.341 All of these
constraints, although well-intentioned, are contrary to what the
public, through its extensive involvement with 401(k) plans, has come
to expect from a retirement system based on personal accounts.
Workers may view their personal Social Security accounts as just
another version of their 401(k) plan accounts.3 42 This potential public
perception of personal Social Security accounts as merely close
cousins of 401(k) plan accounts is likely to be reinforced by efforts to
promote personal accounts to the public by emphasizing that the
money in the account belongs to the worker, not the United States
government.343 Workers may resent the Commission's proposed
constraints on personal Social Security accounts (and become vocal in
making these feelings known to Congressional lawmakers) as an
unjustified attempt by the federal government to control "their"
money.
Would a future Congress yield to this second type of political
pressure? Some experts have argued that access to personal account
government guarantee a minimum rate of investment return for the default fund.
Politicians in both the legislative and executive branches who are opposed to such a
government guarantee may instead send a clear message to the Board and its selected
money managers to adopt a more conservative investment strategy instead, thereby
avoiding short-term losses, but also foregoing potentially greater long-term investment
gains.
338. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 383-92.
339. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
342. Some workers may believe that a personal account is more secure, in terms of
investment volatility and benefits payments, than a 401(k) plan account because the
personal account is designed to partially replace a "secure" traditional Social Security
benefit. The Commission's position on providing federally guaranteed minimum benefits
from personal accounts and an explanation of why workers might be misled into believing
that personal account benefits are more secure than 401(k) plan account benefits are
discussed infra notes 388-92 and accompanying text.
343. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
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funds for non-retirement purposes is inevitable. 3" Unlike 401(k)
plans, however, Social Security traditionally has attracted interest
groups who advocate for low-income workers to protect their
interests in the system. These advocacy groups to date have focused
their lobbying efforts on opposing the idea of personal Social Security
accounts.345 If personal accounts become a political reality, these
advocacy groups may represent a successful counterweight to political
pressure for changes to the regulatory structure for personal accounts
that provide for greater worker control, and pose greater financial
risk, for low-income workers in a personal account system.
2. "Voluntary" Personal Social Security Accounts and Automatic
Enrollment Investment Behavior
The Commission Report identifies numerous potential problems
associated with direct government investment of personal Social
Security accounts.346 Essentially the Commission views a direct
government investment approach as dangerous to both capitalism and
democracy because it would place control over large amounts of
money (and its related power) in the hands of a few government
bureaucrats and money managers.347 The Commission proposes to
avoid these dangers by instead allowing each worker to direct the
investment of her own personal Social Security account.34  The
advantage of this decentralized approach to investing is Truth #4,
that, by giving workers investment control over their personal Social
Security accounts, the system will avoid large concentrations of
money (and its related power) in the hands of a few government
bureaucrats and money managers.349
Recent studies of the investment behavior of participants in
401(k) plans strongly indicate that, contrary to the assertions of Truth
#4, many workers simply will invest their Social Security contributions
in the Board's default investment option,35° the "standard fund." '351
344. See Peter Diamond, Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 1997, at 1, 44.
345. Examples of these advocacy groups include the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, the Century Foundation, the Economic Policy Institute, the National
Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, the Social Security Information
Project, and the Urban League.
346. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 44-45, 48-52.
349. See id. at 38, 60-61.
350. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 5, 23-24; PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 11-13; Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1171-76. This
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The investment managers for the default fund will be selected by the
Board.352 Under the Commission's proposals, these money managers
for the default fund will decide how to invest worker contributions to
the default fund and will vote the corporate stock of the companies in
which they choose to invest the default fund assets.353 The result is
likely to be the very scenario of concentrated investment power and
control that Truth #4 purports to avoid.
To understand why this scenario is likely to emerge, the place to
begin is with the concept of a "voluntary" system of personal Social
Security accounts, a concept left undefined by the Commission.
There are two distinct types of "voluntary" 401(k) plans today.354
Under the traditional 401(k) plan system, an employee must
affirmatively elect to participate in the plan.355 As part of this plan
enrollment process, the employee completes the necessary
paperwork, which typically includes the selection of investment
options for her 401(k) plan contributions. 6  Thus, under the
traditional 401(k) plan, generally there is no need for a designated
"default" investment option.
Since 1998, a second type of "voluntary" 401(k) plan has
emerged-the automatic enrollment 401(k) plan.357  Under an
is particularly true for low-income workers, who make up large numbers of the workforce
covered by Social Security. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
351. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
352. The Commission Report is vague concerning how investment managers for the
default fund actually will be selected. For example, it is unclear what, if any, minimum
qualifications investment managers would have to meet to bid to be the default fund
manager. Additionally, there is an obvious danger in an auction-based system where a low
bid may translate into low-quality investment management, with corresponding poor
investment returns for this segment of the default fund. Alternatively, if the qualifying
criteria to become a competing bidder for managing a portion of the default fund are set
too high, then the pool of bidders may become so small that achieving the underlying
objective of the auction process, to have competition drive the costs of investment
management down, may be an exercise in futility. Compare COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 51 (stating that fund management services for Tier I index funds will be
"auctioned off"), with id. at 52 (failing to discuss how investment managers are to be
selected for the standard default fund).
353. See id. at 62.
354. Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 515-16.
355. Id. at 515.
356. See Medill, Individual Responsibility Model, supra note 16, at 37 n.220.
357. See Medill, Stock Market Volatility, supra note 16, at 515. A recent survey by the
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America found that 8.1% of the 401(k) plans surveyed
used automatic enrollment. Patty Alman, A Look at Current Profit Sharing/401(k) Trends
and Practices, PROFIT SHARING, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 15. The survey found that automatic
enrollment was most common among 401(k) plans sponsored by large employers. Among
401(k) plans surveyed with 5,000 or more participants, 19.8% used automatic enrollment.
Id.
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automatic enrollment 401(k) plan, the employer automatically enrolls
all eligible employees in the plan and then selects the amount of the
employee's salary deferral contributions (typically one to three
percent of the employee's compensation) to the plan. 8 Participation
in an automatic enrollment 401(k) plan is still voluntary in the sense
that the employee may opt out of the plan.359 To do so, however,
requires an affirmative election by the employee not to participate.36 °
Unless and until the participant acts, the employer deducts the preset
amount from the participant's compensation and invests this amount
in the default investment option selected by the employer.36'
Participant investment behavior in automatic enrollment 401(k)
plans has been the subject of several recent studies.362 What
researchers have found is that automatic enrollment 401(k) plans
dramatically increase the percentage of employees who participate in
the plan.363 Significantly, this increase in participation is greatest
among the groups of workers who are least likely to enroll and
participate in a traditional 401(k) plan: younger workers, lower
income workers, and minority workers. 364
Although the Commission does not say which type of
"voluntary" system will be adopted for personal Social Security
accounts, the primary financial solvency projections contained in the
Commission Report for each of the three models assume a sixty-
seven percent participation rate.365 Ironically, the reasons supporting
a relatively high participation rate in a voluntary personal Social
Security account system appear to be much less compelling from a
fiscal perspective than they are from a political perspective. From the
perspective of system financial solvency, the more workers who
contribute to personal accounts, the less money will be available for
358. Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Automatic Enrollment 2001, at http://
www.psca.org/data/autoenroll2001.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 3, 5; PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE,
supra note 107, at 8-13; Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Automatic Enrollment
2001, supra note 358.
363. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 5, 9-12; PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE,
supra note 107, at 9-11.
364. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 3; PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra
note 107, at 10-11; Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1161.
365. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 93-94, 101. The Commission
acknowledges that actual participation rates are likely to vary according to the model
adopted. See id. at 101.
2003]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the U.S. Treasury to pay traditional Social Security benefits. This
worsens the program's solvency in the "short-term" (seventy-five year
actuarial projection period)366 by accelerating the time the system will
begin operating on a negative cash flow basis.367 In contrast, the
political reasons supporting a high participation rate are much more
compelling. The hallmark of the traditional Social Security system
has been its nearly universal participation and coverage of American
workers. It is this attribute that has made the system so popular, and
enduring, in American democratic society. The research concerning
automatic enrollment 401(k) plans predicts that an automatic
enrollment approach to personal accounts is likely to prove effective
in increasing participation rates, particularly among the low-income
workers who make up a large percentage of the workforce covered
under the Social Security system. Moreover, an automatic enrollment
system that boosts participation rates for low-income workers will
blunt the criticism that personal Social Security accounts are designed
to benefit primarily higher income workers. 68 For these political
reasons, an automatic enrollment approach to personal accounts
seems inevitable.369
366. "Short-term" obviously has a unique meaning when used in the context of Social
Security reforms. Only Model 2 projects to return the Social Security system to a positive
cash flow within the seventy-five year actuarial projection period. See discussion supra
note 9.
367. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, app. at i-vii; DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 140, at 2-4.
368. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 298, at 1173.
369. This conflict between the fiscal and political incentives for personal accounts
highlights the inherent conflict of interest created by the Board's role as the primary
provider of "informative" advice to workers concerning the investment of their personal
Social Security accounts. Even under a "voluntary" automatic enrollment approach,
workers may affirmatively elect not to participate in personal accounts. High rates of
worker participation in personal accounts, however, are necessary to achieve sustained
political support for reform. On the one hand the Board's program of "informative"
advice must be objective and forthright about the risks of investing in personal accounts,
particularly in terms of the offsetting decrease in traditional benefits at retirement. The
need for such honesty is particularly compelling in light of wide-spread public ignorance
concerning the traditional benefits provided by the current Social Security system. The
2001 Retirement Confidence Survey found that "[m]any workers greatly underestimate
the amount they will receive from Social Security when they retire." EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., THE 2001 RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS 3, at http://www.ebri.org/rcs/2001/O1rcses.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). On the other hand, the Board's educational
program cannot deter large numbers of workers from voluntarily participating in a
reformed Social Security system of personal accounts, or else political support for reform
will be undermined. This is indeed a delicate balancing act. Cynics may contend it is an
impossible one.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND 401(K) PLANS
How are workers in an automatic enrollment system likely to
invest the assets held in personal Social Security accounts? The
research concerning automatic enrollment 401(k) plans indicates that
a high percentage of participants are invested exclusively in the plan's
designated default investment fund.370 Although this percentage
appears to decline somewhat over time, nevertheless substantial
numbers of automatically enrolled participants remain invested in the
plan's default investment option.37' There is no reason to believe that
workers who are automatically enrolled in a personal Social Security
account will change this investment pattern. It seems more likely that
this pattern of remaining invested in the designated default
investment option will prove even stronger in a personal account
system where large numbers of low-income workers are covered.372
Indeed, the Commission recognizes that workers who are
inexperienced investors are likely to view the Board's standard fund
as a safe place to invest.373 The result i§ likely to be a ballooning of
the assets invested in the Board's default standard fund.
This tendency of automatically enrolled workers to remain
invested in the Board's default mutual fund is likely to be
strengthened and reinforced by the Board's criteria for, and
representation of, the investment return objectives for the default
fund. In the 401(k) plan setting, employers have tended to select a
low-earning stable value (U.S. government bond) fund as the plan's
default investment option.374  In contrast, the Commission
recommends that the default fund for personal Social Security
accounts must be diversified and must use an equity investment
strategy (aggressive, moderate, or conservative) that is appropriate
for the worker's age.375 This Commission recommendation is
followed by the following cautionary statement:
370. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 5, 12-19; PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 11-13; Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1171-76.
371. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 5, 12-19; PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE, supra note 107, at 11-13; Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1171-76.
372. See DEFAULT EFFECTS, supra note 122, at 19 (concluding that "[liower paid
participants are much more likely to be at the default than are higher paid participants,
and the fraction of participants at the default is more persistent for the lower paid");
Madrian & Shea, supra note 253, at 1171-76.
373. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
374. See id.
375. See id. Curiously, the Commission Report cites the Path of Least Resistance study
in support of the assertion that workers will look to the asset allocation of the standard
default fund when independently making their own investment allocation decisions. See
id. Although it is true that some workers will do this, the Commission seems to ignore the
principal conclusion of the Path of Least Resistance study, namely that automatically
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If the government, for example, promises that the personal
accounts will produce a minimum return or benefit, provided
that the personal account is invested in a particular balanced
fund, then that fund should be the standard [default] fund.376
This statement by the Commission is curious indeed. Contrary to the
common disclaimer given by investment managers ("past investment
returns are not necessarily indicative of future investment
performance"), any such promises by the Board will be perceived by
workers, particularly workers who are inexperienced or risk-averse
investors, as an implied warranty that the default fund will achieve a
minimum level of investment returns.377 (The Commission Report,
however, does not recommend a minimum federal government
guarantee of investment returns from the default fund. 378) In this
sense, the Board's default fund appears to mimic another common
investment option in 401(k) plans-the guaranteed investment
contract ("GIC"). In the 401(k) plan setting, the empirical evidence
shows that when the plan offers a GIC (but not employer stock) as an
investment option, participants lower their allocations to equity
mutual funds.379 Similarly, large numbers of workers are likely to
respond to implied government promises of minimum investment
returns by investing in the Board's default fund rather than in other
equity fund options.
Why is the accumulation of significant sums in the default fund
for personal accounts so troublesome? The . Commission Report
identifies three risks associated with direct government investment of
the funds held in personal Social Security accounts. First, there is the
risk that government officials will be pressured into making
investment decisions to promote social policy rather than on financial
criteria ("social investing"), resulting in below-market investment
returns.38 ° Second, the role of government as a large institutional
enrolled workers have a strong tendency to remain invested in the default investment
option. Compare PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, supra note 107, § 111.1, with id § 111.6.
376. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis added).
377. The Commission Report later recognizes and discusses the problems associated
with explicit investment guarantees. See id. at 143-45.
378. See id.
379. See 2000 ASSET ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 16, at 8 & tbl.4.
380. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38, 60. The Commission Report
describes examples of social investing, primarily in the context of pension funds operated
by state governments. See id. For theoretical discussions of the legalities and economic
merits of social investing in private pension plans and private trusts, see generally John H.
Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV.
72 (1980). For the Department of Labor's position on social investing and fiduciary
responsibilities under ERISA, see 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2002).
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investor could interfere with corporate decision-making.3 1 Finally,
having the federal government as a corporate shareholder could lead
to conflicts of interest between the government's dual roles of
maximizing investment value for workers and regulating public
corporations and public markets.382
The Commission Report addresses the first risk, that political
pressure will lead to social investing and reduced investment returns,
by arguing that under a personal account structure "the temptation
for political interference is significantly reduced. '383 The logic of the
Commission's argument is that the temptation to engage in social
investing is unique to the context of defined benefit pension plans
sponsored by state governments. There are two aspects to this
argument. First, in a defined benefit plan structure there is not a
visible and direct link between current inferior investment returns
and the future pension benefits promised to the worker.384 This lack
of a direct connection masks the fiscal consequences of social
investing and reduces the accountability of the plan's investment
managers. Second, state government pension plans are exempt from
the minimum funding requirements that federal law imposes on
defined benefit pension plans sponsored by private employers.385 If a
private employer-sponsored pension plan suffers poor investment
results, there is an immediate financial consequence to the employer,
who must make additional contributions to the plan if it falls below
the minimum funding standards of federal law.386 This immediate
financial accountability serves as a deterrent to social investing in the
context of defined benefit plans sponsored by private employers. In a
defined benefit pension plan sponsored by a state government,
however, there is no immediate financial consequence. The liabilities
represented by the plan's promised benefits are simply shifted to
future generations of taxpayers, whose taxes ultimately will pay for
the plan's benefits when they become due.387
The Commission argues that these conditions, which make state
officials and plan investment managers susceptible to political
pressure to engage in social investing, are mitigated by a personal
381. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38, 60.
382. See id. Imagine the conflict of interest if, for example, the federal government on
behalf of the Social Security system had invested in Enron or Worldcom prior to
revelations of improper accounting practices and fraud.
383. Id. at 61.
384. See id. at 60-61.
385. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1) (2002).
386. See id. §§ 1081-82.
387. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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account structure.388 A closer examination of this argument reveals
several reasons for skepticism. As structured by the Commission,
personal Social Security accounts also have features that may tend to
blur the connection, in the minds of workers who invest in the default
fund, between the default fund's investment returns and their future
retirement income security. In a 401(k) plan, the connection is
clear-the worker's account balance represents the amount he or she
has to spend in retirement. The balance in the worker's personal
account, however, is not the worker's sole benefit from Social
Security. Workers know that they also will receive traditional Social
Security benefits. Workers will be told, of course, through the
Board's "informative" advice program, that their future traditional
benefits will be reduced by a formula that assumes their personal
accounts earned a specified rate of investment return. But this offset
will not be computed and translated into a dollar amount per month
until years later when the worker retires.
The Board's message concerning the future offset of traditional
benefits also is likely to become lost due to the Board's larger role,
and message, in providing investment education to workers. The
Board certainly will encourage workers to follow the basic principles
of prudent long-term investing, i.e., be diversified and stay invested
during market downturns. Simultaneously with this message, the
Board will offer a designated default fund, which purports to be
managed to achieve the offset rate. If the default fund underperforms
(either the market benchmarks or the specified offset rate, or both)
due to social investing, will workers respond? Or will they simply
shrug and tell themselves that they are invested for the long term-in
other words, follow the Board's advice?
The tangential link between present investment returns from the
default fund and the future offset of the worker's traditional Social
Security benefits also creates the potential for shifting the hidden
costs of social investing, in terms of lower investment earnings, to
future taxpayers. Some experts already are anticipating a situation
where, due to demographic and economic conditions, the equity
markets do not produce a rate of investment return sufficient to
attain the Commission's offset amount.389 In discussing how to
finance a possible "guarantee" of a minimum investment return for
personal accounts, the Commission itself identifies the concern that
388. See id.
389. See Harris, supra note 145; Letter from Dean Baker to Steve Gross, supra note
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the federal government as "guarantor may be asked to pay out
precisely when economic conditions ... are bleak,' 390 and that
"taxpayers might be unwilling or unable to raise taxes on themselves
to cover the guarantees. ' 391  Suppose that, thirty years hence, the
Commission's default fund has underperformed the offset rate for
personal accounts. Faced with a generation of newly retired personal
account holders who now realize that they are worse off financially
for having participated in a personal account, what will be the likely
political response? Given the historical politics of Social Security
reform, it seems unlikely that Congressional lawmakers will ignore
the complaints of a generation of newly retired voters. Instead, it
seems more plausible that Congress will instead simply reduce the
offset rate, thereby shifting the costs of social investing by the default
fund to future generations of taxpayers, but without incurring the
immediate pain of a payroll tax increase.392
The accumulation of significant assets in the Board's designated
default fund also would present risks similar to the second and third
dangers associated by the Commission with direct government
investment of the funds held in personal Social Security accounts.
The Commission asserts that under a system of direct government
investment, as a large institutional investor, the federal government
could interfere with corporate decision-making.393 The Commission's
390. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 143 ("While the [traditional Social Security] benefit formula does not
subject individuals to financial market uncertainty, the formula itself can be changed and
has been changed in the U.S. numerous times in the past."); DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra
note 140, at 25-26 (concluding that the Commission's proposed Model 2 would require a
general revenue transfer of more than $2.2 trillion, with a similar result for Model 3); id. at
37 ("A claim of long-term balance that is heavily dependent on substantial, unspecified
general revenue transfers, however, raises questions of credibility, especially when the
Commission makes no recommendations regarding where the money to be transferred
should be found."). Cf. GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES ET AL., JUNIOR MUST PAY:
PRICING THE IMPLICIT PUT IN PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 8906, 2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8906 (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (assuming that the government adopts a centralized
approach to privatization and invests part of the Social Security Trust Funds in the equity
markets, the study concludes that "there is a distinct possibility that Social Security funds
[will] decline in value" and that "the government may be compelled to remedy a shortfall
by raising taxes on the younger working generations"); PETER R. ORSZAG & ROBERT
GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FINANCING PRIVATE
ACCOUNTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TAX BILL: THE CHALLENGE FACING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION 15 (2001) (concluding that a
future tax increase to avert budget deficits is among the alternatives facing policymakers
for financing private Social Security accounts).
393. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38, 60.
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proposed structure does not eliminate this risk. Instead, it merely
shifts this risk from the federal government to the select group of
investment managers chosen by the Board to manage the assets of the
default fund.394  In other words, the potential for corporate
interference is shifted from publicly accountable government officials
to a few private entities and individuals operating under a contract
with the Board, a situation that arguably is less desirable and less
protective of the public's interest.
Finally, the Commission asserts that under a system of personal
accounts, the federal government will avoid a potential conflict of
interest because it will not be serving in a dual role as the asset
manager for Social Security funds and the regulator of public
corporations and markets.395 This potential conflict of interest is
lessened, but not eliminated, under a personal account system. It will
still exist due to the Board's oversight of the default fund for personal
accounts.
CONCLUSION: WINNERS AND LOSERS
This Article evaluated personal Social Security accounts in light
of the substantial body of research concerning participant-directed
401(k) plans. This research suggests that each of the four "truths"
cited by the Commission in support of personal accounts may, in fact,
merely be political myths.
Viewing the research evidence from 401(k) plans as a whole,
what can be said about the likely winners and losers under the
Commission's proposed personal Social Security account system?
Workers who are knowledgeable and experienced investors will
adopt a diversified investment strategy that, over the long run, is most
likely to result in real investment returns that will exceed the amount
offset from their traditional Social Security benefits paid at
retirement. These are the potential "winners" under a personal
account system. But for many workers, particularly low-income
workers, a personal account system will be their first significant
investment experience. Fearful of any type of investment loss with
their Social Security funds, and not sophisticated enough to
appreciate the loss in purchasing power inflicted by inflation over
time, workers who make an affirmative investment election are most
394. The Commission recommends that the fund managers vote the equity shares held
by the fund, rather than passing voting rights through to the Board or the workers
themselves. See id. at 62.
395. See id. at 38, 60.
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likely to choose a "safe" investment strategy and avoid investing in
equity mutual funds so that their Social Security account funds will
not be exposed to the short-term volatility of the stock market. A
Board-provided program of "informative" advice is unlikely to
change the investment behavior of many of these workers. Over the
long term, the real investment returns for non-equity investors are
likely to be less than the Commission's projected 4.6% average
annual real rate of return. Many may not even attain the much lower
(2.0%-3.5%) proposed offset rates for traditional benefits.
Alternatively, many inexperienced investors are likely to invest
in the Board's designated default mutual fund. The investment
performance of this fund will be the true measure of whether the
Commission's projected total Social Security benefits, based on an
assumed 4.6% real rate of return, are realistic. One telling indication
that these projected total benefits may not be realistic is that the
Commission refused to recommend a federal government guarantee
that the default fund returns would even match the much lower
proposed offset rates for traditional benefits.
Low-income and minority workers will be the group most
adversely affected by the Commission's proposed indexing changes,
which will substantially reduce the future value of scheduled
traditional, disability, and survivor benefits. The personal account
benefits paid to low-income workers who survive to retirement will be
further reduced by the costs of adverse selection associated with the
traditional annuity payment option. Adverse selection costs will fall
disproportionately on low-income workers because they are the ones
least able to bear the risks of longevity associated with the
Commission's alternative payment option, self-annuitization. In
contrast, high-income workers will benefit from the self-annuity
option as a mechanism for intergenerational wealth transfer.
Promoting the intergenerational transmission of wealth, however, has
never been a policy objective of the traditional Social Security system.
Rather, the primary policy goal of the traditional Social Security
program has been to provide a social safety net for the segment of the
American population that is most vulnerable to poverty in old age.
The cumulative effect of the Commission's proposals is likely to be
lesser total benefits for low-income and minority workers than under
today's traditional Social Security system. They will be the group
most likely to "lose" under a reformed personal Social Security
account system.
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